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The definition of piracy or to define its origin in time and space is far too 
complicated and difficult than it has been in the recent times. This study attempts to 
reveal how piracy was originally perpetrated and understood, proceeded by a 
contemporary perspective. It also intends to identify limitations of laws and 
counterattacks, such as: conceptual limits, gaps, marginal strategies and other aspects. 
We attempt to contemplate a range of solutions to prosecute pirates, revealing the legal 
weakness and jurisdictional conflicts. Finally, the course of history gives us the 
following perception: piracy was seen as a crime if it opposed to interests of nations. 
The lack of interest of States to suppress piracy and its unconcern led to its entrenched, 
proliferation, domain and sophistication in certain regions of the globe. This work has 
the aim to bring the branch of human rights to the core of the problem in a three – 
pronged approach: piracy prohibition, suppression and roots, studying the available 
theories about this epidemic problem.  
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A definição de pirataria ou a desmistificação da sua origem, no tempo e espaço, 
revela maiores dificuldades do que atualmente. Com este trabalho propusemo-nos a 
estudar como é que a pirataria era perpetrada e entendida no passado, bem como no 
presente. Também nos propomos a identificar limitações legais e as medidas operativas 
no combate à pirataria, como por exemplo: limites conceptuais, lacunas, estratégias, 
entre outros. Por outro lado, atendemos as soluções encontradas no combate à pirataria 
sem deixar de observar fraqueza da lei e conflitos entre jurisdições. Por fim, o curso da 
história dá-nos a seguinte percepção: a pirataria era tida como crime se fosse contra os 
interesses das nações. O desinteresse dos Estados para reprimir a pirataria possibilitou o 
seu aumento, proliferação, domínio e sofisticação em certas regiões do Mundo. O 
presente trabalho tem como objetivo trazer para o centro da discussão os direitos 
humanos numa perspetiva tripla: proibição da pirataria, supressão e raízes, aliando o 
estudo de possíveis respostas a dar a esta epidemia. 
Palavras-chaves: pirataria moderna, raízes, direitos humanos, Somália, Nigéria, 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute a reliable basis for analysing 
maritime piracy. After a thorough search, this paper intends to present the key points on 
the subject of piracy. 
The definition of piracy or to define its origin in time and space is far too 
complicated and difficult than it has been in the recent past. If we do not want to dig or 
go far beyond the time of the division of the world by Pope in the fifteenth century 
between Portugal and Spain, it would be much easier to explain. As after the 
demarcation of the World, separated by two lines, decided the legality or illegality of 
any one plying those seas or oceans without the permission of Portugal or Spain were 
the violators of the laws and considered as pirates. It is altogether a different question 
whether they were right or wrong in terms of international laws. But the question rises 
was there any international law to prohibit or to permit any individual or group of 
individual to navigate in the sea for any purposes. Navigation was free and no one 
needed any permission to travel anywhere. But the division of the World by Pope 
Alexander VI, in 1494, during the treaty of Tordesilhas, gave exclusive powers to the 
two above mentioned countries which, on the basis of rights they received in the form 
of a Papal Bull, declared their rights of navigations and prohibition for any Catholic or 
non-Catholic countries. Portugal was the first to initiate and exercise its power over the 
discovered countries by providing them a Cartaz, which could be explained as a 
passport for navigation from one place to the other, paying the legal taxes or customs to 
the Portuguese authorities. This Cartaz has exclusive features: who the captain was, the 
name of the ship or ships, crew members, their nationalities or origin, merchandise 
permitted to import or export. All those ships navigating without the Cartaz, were 
subject to confiscation of their merchandise or goods and were only allowed to navigate 
after the payment of customs/duties. In many cases, they were burnt and destroyed if 
they resisted the Portuguese ships demanding to show the Cartaz. On the other hand, 
those who disobeyed the Portuguese authorities were considered as Pirates, since they 
escape the payment of duties. This system was known as Mare Clausvm or the sea is 
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close. In general, Portuguese faced a lot of resistance from the Asian countries in the 
Indian Ocean region where they found an organised political and navigational system. 
They did not obey the Portuguese or they did not think right or logical for the 
Portuguese to collect taxes over their goods and prohibiting them to ply, although they 
were having the support of their local governments. However, the Portuguese theory of 
Mare Clausvm was refuted by Hugo Grotius towards the end of the sixteenth century, 
claiming that the seas are open for all, and his theory cost him his life. 
Once this theory was refuted, there was a Portuguese answer by Frei Serafim de 
Freitas, Do Justo Império Asiático in 1625, which was earlier elaborated by João de 
Barros, the well-known Portuguese chronicler and theorist. Later, in 1635 the theory of 
John Selden appeared, who wrote: “An abridgement of all the Sea-Laws”, which denied 
the right of all other theorist but the right of the English over the entire world. After this 
a number of theories were presented by several authors. But the main theory which 
dominated the International laws was “Might is Right”. The powerful countries 
dominated the weaker and justified their rights by force. Anyone or any country could 
be called pirates, robbers or any name that the dominating country wanted to give. The 
rights of the weak sovereigns put to a stake. Just for examples all the Asian ships in the 
Indian Ocean were called holding pirate ships, from Mozambique till China, during the 
sixteenth and the early twentieth century. 
We here, therefore, would like to focus on, as a much as it is possible to study, in 
the following passages, the origin and theory and the Laws about Piracy without giving 
a chance of supporting is biased theories to justify, the right of navigation or whosoever, 
try to deprive the others’ right for navigation. In principle, as will be seen, the pirate is 
someone who tries to take over a ship or ships by force without having any right for the 
same. Or, the one who tries to capture some ship or ships without any lawful right for 
the same. But, in general, piracy, or the sacking or looting of ships always existed since 
time immemorial. We hear about the existence of piracy as early as during the Roman 
period even much before, at least since the human race started its commercial and 
navigational activities.  
Soon after, when people started to develop consciousness about the differences 
between right or wrong, different laws to prohibit such activities developed. And as 
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time passed by, piracy accompanied the scientific developments, so did the measures 
and laws to control it.  
The main purpose and the theme of this dissertation is to describe  piracy and to 
show why some international laws and efforts to control piracy appeared, such as for 
example the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) and 
other, important international laws against piracy. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned 
before, about the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries laws and discussions, there have 
been uncountable amount of laws and prohibitions that have appeared according to the 
necessities of the time, until 1982. But here, we would like to focus mainly on the 
UNCLOS and its policies which have been adopted by some countries and not others. 
We have also tried to see if this law could make any change in the mentality of the 
pirates and their actions changed or they were discouraged by this and they modified 
their course of action fearing the implications and punishments. But as it has been 
understood through our study, most of its clauses were subject to the adaptation by the 
States or governments itself, it could bring the results which had been expected to have 
by these laws. Moreover, the biggest challenge is our concern about the applicability of 
international human rights during the suppression of piracy. 
 The first chapter provides a chronological development or a historical 
background of piracy through the ages. We aim to identify the roots of piracy and how 
it continued century after century and still exists. Once we have studied its historical 
background, we would like then to discuss various scholarly discussions about this 
theme. At the end of this chapter, we are going to analyse a few case studies of modern 
piracy.  
The question arises why even at the present moment different maritime nations 
have not been able to stop maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and the 
surrounding Gulf of Aden in East Africa and in other parts of the world. The 
international community, nowadays, is facing a rather sophisticated armed piracy on a 
considerably higher level than earlier. The question is to how tackle this present 
situation and what methods can be applied for an effective combat against piracy if even 
the nations like United States and other maritime nations fail to do away with it. Ships 
of all the countries, their crew and the economy of States are at stake and facing a great 
danger due to the threats of pirates. 
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    The second chapter will study the present political and economic barrier has 
created endangering day to day life. Several countries have divided and built up their 
own opinion for and against. But before we introduce all those issues that piracy has 
raised, another approach will be presented, the concern about the violation of human 
rights that the pirates have imposed. Moreover, we also aim to discuss the Human 
Rights of the pirates as defended by the Human Rights organisations. In certain cases it 
often appears that Human Rights Activist, worry more about the Pirate’s Civil rights 
than those of victims!    
Closer attention is going to be given to the some of the recent cases of piracy 
committed by the Somalis and Nigerians and the relevance of countermeasures adopted 
in those regions. Furthermore, pirates’ attacks will be distinguished in their forms of 
operations from one place to the other. If, in 1993, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) conducted a study that defined a pirate typology applicable to all 
locations, such as: 1) low-level armed robbery: opportunistic attacks mounted close to 
land, 2) medium-level armed assault and robbery: piracy carried out further from shore, 
often in a narrow sea-lanes, with a high probability of using violence, and 3) major 
criminal attack: well-resourced and smoothly run operations in which violence is 
commonly employed, not only to rob money or goods from a ship, but to confiscate the 
ship itself. Currently, hijackings and hostage-for-ransom situations has given a new 
dimension to piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. Even though violence is 
common, hijacked crews are more likely to survive the encounter because they are 
worth more, alive than dead. Geography plays an important role in what type of piracy 
is most likely to be carried out. The Gulf of Aden is an area that occupies over 2.5 
million square miles of ocean whose neighbouring States include Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania along the Gulf of Aden, making it one of the most 
important waterways in the world, as it links the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez 
Canal.  
The third chapter will try to present the possible of solutions to prevent piracy 
and punish pirates. This Chapter will also discuss legal weaknesses and jurisdictional 
conflicts. It has been noticed that the International law and the laws of nations regarding 
piracy many times are considerably incompatible, and thus, create legal obstacles that 
minimises accountability and provide the perceptions of weaknesses. In addition, an 
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effort will also be undertaken to study the simulations made by the theorists Barry and 





In the Indian Ocean, after the arrival of the Portuguese on the western coast of 
India, the Portuguese treated all the sea-going merchant ships as illegal and pirates who 
did not have their Cartaz
1
, as has been mentioned earlier. Later we find in the Atlantic 
and in the Indian Oceans towards the end of the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, a number of Portuguese ships were sacked and robbed and looted by the 
English and the Dutch whom the Portuguese called pirates, but the British and the 
Dutch considered it their right of navigation and sacking other ships was lawful and 
highly respected in those countries. Taking the case of Sir Francis Drake of England, for 
example, he was highly appreciated, respected and was granted the title as “Sir” by 
Queen Elizabeth I. He was never punished, although he looted and sunk so many 
Portuguese ships. 
Currently, we hear more about piracy than we did in earlier days. During the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the world lived under the Pax Britannica, since in 
the eighteenth century, the British Royal Navy had taken measures to suppress piracy. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that piracy throughout that period had been 
supported by European Sovereignties, which in turn led to the development of the 
practice of privateering to piracy
2
. But, later on, to counter this reality, the supremacy of 
the English Empire brought a significant change maritime legal practice (development 
of Admiralty Courts and Navy). The same practice of controlling the ships, in its more 
human form, on the other hand, was also adopted to suppress slave trade. The law 
against the slave trade was created in1807
3
.  
                                                 
1
 Afzal Ahmad. Portuguese Trade and Socio-Economic Changes on the Western Coast of India 1600-1663. New 
Delhi, India, Originals, 2000,pp. 33-60. And Afzal Ahmad. Indo- Portuguese diplomacy during the 16th and 17th 
centuries (1500-1663), New Delhi, India Originals, 2008, pp. 51-70. 
2 Bruce A. Elleman, [et al.]. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies. Edited by Bruce A. 
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg. Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2010. p. v. 
3 Jenny S. Martinez. The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. p.3. 
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This aggressive approach by the British Royal Navy, in order to suppress piracy, 
spread a general feeling that maritime piracy had been banished forever. For many 
scholars the discussion about piracy as a crime became obsolete. Piracy was only 
mentioned as an historical fact and pirates as enemies of all mankind – hostis humani 
generis. 
In a relatively short period of time, phenomena, such as globalisation and 
extremely sophisticated mass media
4
, revitalised the ideology about piracy, which had 
been thought to be extinct. The international community became aware of transnational 
crimes and as well the growth of piratical attacks, thus the International Legal Order 
faced new challenges. Policing the seas, nowadays, requires far more endeavours from 
States, on the same pattern as those required to curb terrorism
5
. As Anthony Giddens 
notes “[t]he American sociologist Daniel Bell (…) says that the nation becomes not 
only too small to solve big problems, but also too large to solve the small ones”
6
. This 
statement highlights the weakness of an isolationistic policy and the need for a wider 
cooperation. 
1.1 Historical Perspective  
Classical authors, such as Herodotus, always made reference about the practice 
of piracy. Classical scholars identify piracy “as a product of uncivilized societies”
7
, 
meant to be suppressed by civilised societies. The historiographer Philip Charles de 
Souza defines piracy as an act of “armed robbery involving the use of ships”
8
. This 
assumption leads the author to demystify what the classics described as an act of piracy 
in their speeches, which varied from banditry to plundering. 
 Linguistically, piracy and banditry were words too similar in the ancient time, 
especially in Greek, for example “Leistés and Peiratés can be translated as pirate”, but 
also as banditry. Although, there was the word Katapontistés, which literally meant 
pirate, Hellenics did not make use of said word for it was considered to be too rude. On 
                                                 
4 Alberto M. Vara Branco. O Contributo dos Mass Media no Ensino da História. Lisboa: IIE, 2002. pp.76-81. 
5 Anthony Guiddens. Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives. 2nd. London: Profile Books, 2002. 
p. XVII. 
6 Ibid., p.13. 
7 Philip Charles de Souza. Piracy in the Ancient World: from Minos to Mohammed. Ph.D Thesis in History, London: 
University of London, 1992. p. 19. 
8 Ibid., p.13. 
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the other hand, Latin presented fewer difficulties, for example Praedo and Pirata
9
. 
Differently, when carried out by the Tyrrhenian, followed by the Cretans and then the 
Sicilians, piracy was seen as a legacy. The last ones were the most savages, not even 
showing the slightest respect for what was considered sacred at the time
10
. 
Subject of speeches, philosophical or fictional works, and piracy had prompted 
out an ambiguous gaze. If some admired it, others condemn it, expressing said 
condemnation in their works, such as Homer in Iliad and Odyssey and Cicero in his 
speech to prosecute Gaius Verres (70 B.C.). Verres as a governor (of Sicily) did not 
attempt to stop and punish pirates and for his misconduct Cicero connected Verres to 
piracy
11
.  Later, in seventeenth century, Grotius in On the Law of the War and Peace, 
states that those who violate the law of nature and the law of nations must be punished 
and sovereigns ought to prosecute enemies of mankind
12
. The origins of piracy are 
correlated to the flourishing of maritime commerce. This explains why the rate of 
piratical attacks has always been related to the growth (or not) of commerce. This is not 
an assumption recognised nowadays, but something that Strabo recognised between 63 
B.C. and A.D. 21.  
Greeks struggled with piracy, but it was in the Roman Republic that harder 
measures were taken. Pompey is known to have fought a “Naval War” against Sicilian 
pirates
13
 and had almost vanquished piracy from the Mediterranean (66 B.C.). 
If some authors notice that piracy was seen as a profession praised by the 
Sicilian nobility, others saw it as a way to increase personal incomes; authors such as 
Strabo identify poverty
14
 as a source of piracy. Strabo also pointed out corruption as 
another source, but corruption had already been pointed out by Cicero in the 
prosecution of Verres. Another source of piracy was unlawful governments. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 27-51 
10 Abel N. Pena. Espártaco Epicteto e outros Escravos: Pirataria e Escravatura na Roma Antiga. Vultos da 
Antiguidade. Edited by coord. Marina Cristina Pimentel. Sintra: Editorial Inquérito, 1996. pp. 10-19. 
11 Philip Charles de Souza. Piracy in the Ancient World: from Minos to Mohammed. Ph.D Thesis in History, London: 
University of London, 1992. pp. 166-167. 
12 Hugo Grotius. On the Law of War and Peace. Translated by A.M. A.C. Campeell. Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books, 
2001. p. 207. 
13 Sicilian piracy is one of the most noticeable cases of piracy in the ancient world, because piracy was considered a 
profession of nobility and warriors. In Abel N. Pena. Espártaco Epicteto e outros Escravos: Pirataria e 
Escravatura na Roma Antiga. Vultos da Antiguidade. Edited by coord. Marina Cristina Pimentel. Sintra: Editorial 
Inquérito, 1996. p. 10. And Philip Charles de Souza. Piracy in the Ancient World: from Minos to Mohammed. Ph.D 
Thesis in History, London: University of London, 1992.pp. 83-85. 
14 Philip Charles de Souza. Piracy in the Ancient World: from Minos to Mohammed. Ph.D Thesis in History, London: 
University of London, 1992. p. 94. 
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 In the beginning, piracy and warfare were not distinguishable; it was not until 
States started to settle their boundaries and unify internal forces that a difference 
emerged. Having their own armies, meant States no longer needed piracy as an ally. 
Whether the emergence of States in the ancient world clarified one practice over the 
other, the reality is that States continued to engage and sponsor piracy. Piracy, when 
allied to a State, could be seen as an act of undeclared war
15
, not only in the Ancient 
world, but throughout human history. 
However, whether piratical attacks exceeded boundaries settled by States or 
were autonomous of any alliance, piracy was seen as a selfish and despicable activity 
that should be suppressed and banished. Acts of kidnapping, ransoms, sacks and violent 
robberies were the modus operandi of pirates.  
Piracy has always been seen as a threat, which no one could escape. Even, Julius 
Caesar was kidnaped and remained in captivity for forty days until a ransom was paid 
(76-75 B.C.).  
During the Roman Republic, Pompey was the one that released Romans from 
piracy. Nonetheless, it was only in the Principate that the threat was absent from 
Romans’ lives. Concomitant with Augustus’s power, piracy disappeared and the 
outburst of any piratical incident would be rapidly suppressed -Pax Romana-. 
Nevertheless, the fall of the Western Roman Empire dictated, once again, the 
outbreak of piracy. In the middle ages, several safe-ports and “States” emerged to 
support piracy. Vikings engaged in piratical raids in the North of Europe and along the 
Iberian Peninsula’s coast.
16
 In North Africa, pirates were settling down States to support 
their activities. Later, in the Indic, Madagascar
17
 pirates led several attacks on the route 
from Europe to India. Consequentially, the Caribbean Sea was known to have had the 
most powerful fleet of pirates on earth. Tortuga, at the time, was considered a Pirate 
Republic (fifteenth-seventeenth century). This powerful fleet appeared as a form of 
retaliation to the Spanish monopoly.  
                                                 
15 Philip Souza. Piracy in the Ancient World., pp. 105-106. 
16 Alfred P. Rubin. The Law of Piracy. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1988. p.307. 
17 Libertatia Republic is another full-scape state of pirates. It is believed that heterogenic population lived there under a 
libertarian-egalitarian regime. Being described by the romancist Daniel Defoe and an incongruity in dates given 
open the question whether Libertatia really existed. 
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Limited resources precluded States from creating a navy with the sole purpose of 
protecting the merchant marine from enemy attacks. This security gap was closed 
through the creation of legal concepts such as: Letters of Marque, Commissions for 
Privateering and Prize Law
18
.  
The Golden Age of Piracy arose as a consequence of excessive commissions 
given to privateers and from the loss of control by States. Conversely, by the 
seventeenth century Letters of Marque were recognised as belligerent acts.
19
 These 
letters were the first legal instrument used to refund a merchant in case of loss of cargo 
and/or ship as a consequence of a naval enemy attack. The “plaintiff” should at first 
address to the offender State. If this attempt failed the next step was to readdress his 
complain to his own State in order to initiate diplomatic channels. Failing results from 
diplomatic channels, a Letter of Marque was issued by the “plaintiff’s” sovereign. This 
letter legitimised the captor
20
 to seek direct restitution by attacking the trade of the 
offender state. 
When it was no longer possible for the issuance of Letters of Marque, States 
started to sponsor armadas, known as privateers, during a war. Their main target was the 
enemy’s maritime commerce; through the raid or plunder of merchant vessels, 
privateers would get their prize. This was a way to weaken the enemy power and at the 
same time engage in a naval war without spending treasury resources. Prizes’ value 
started to be controlled by the ally nation, at first under the authority of the crown and 
then by the National Prize Courts. So, the regulation of prizes developed into a “system 
of laws applicable to the capture of prize at sea, dealing with such matters as the rights 
of captors and the distribution of the proceeds”
21
. 
Elleman [et al.] presents two leading reasons for the uprise of piratical attacks in 
the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries: the British Navigation Act of 1651
22
, and the 
                                                 
18 Bruce A. Elleman, [et al.]. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies. Edited by Bruce A. 
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg. Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2010. p. 12. 
19  Ibid., p.4. 
20 Captor is defined as the “Holder of a letter of marque”, see supra note 18. 
21 Bryan A. Garner. ed. Black's Law Dictionary. 8th. Thomson West, 2004. p.1238. 
22 Cromwell enacted Navigation Act of 1651 with the intent to impoverish the Dutch’s trade. In that way settled that 
only British ships could do coastal trade and to transport certain goods, such as sugar and tobacco, from the 
metropolis to the colonies and vice-versa. English government enacted this act beyond others aiming to control 
trade overseas and promote it. Historians established the navigation act of 1651 a mark that turn the British 
merchant fleet, but uncertainty remains. In The New Caxton Encyclopedia. Vol. 14. London: Caxton & English 
Educatinal Programmes International Limited, 1986. pp. 139-140. 
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refusal of privateers to cease their activities after the ratification of the Utrecht Treaty 
(1713).  
The upsurge of imperialism brought what we today call an “economy of world 
scale”. With vast domains from West to East a powerful fleet was required to protect 
mercantilists’ aims. Empires overseas demanded higher control, this time not by 
autonomous naval forces, which could easily disrupt settled bounds from empires’ 
control. Moreover, maritime legal practice took new steps. States began to empower 
their naval fleet, and, attacks on the commerce were no longer acceptable in the 
international community. Also imperialist powers agreed to forbid privateering 
practices (Declaration of Paris, 1856)
23
. 
Whether England was one of the major sponsored-States of piracy, it was the 
first nation of the Modern World to police the seas, suppress piratical attacks and other 
activities that in time proved to be and were recognised as inhuman. Pax Britannica, 
revealed the hegemony of British Royal Navy and the monopoly of maritime trade 
routes. 
1.2 Modern Piracy  
At the present time, maritime piracy is more than a theoretical threat, it is a 
reality on the forefront. Self-interest and a hypothetical demise for a while led States to 
overlook piratical incidents as a reality. But once their economic interests were in risk, 
another glance was the development of the concept of modern piracy.  
Modern Piracy affects economies, maritime safety as well as the policy of Mare 
Libervm policy, international commerce and the marine environment. Not only does it 
bring material concerns, but mostly it violates human rights. Some argue that an 
intersection of international branches may result in a better approach.  
Television channels around the world report news and documentaries concerning 
piracy. Their aim is not only to present news in order to inform, but also to appeal to the 
receptivity, judgement and concern of States and individuals. So, it is a way to shock 
the international community. In the midst of this one question arises: What is piracy? 
An international crime or a transnational crime: academics are divided.   
                                                 
23 Bruce A. Elleman, [et al.]. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies. Edited by Bruce A. 
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg. Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2010. p. 8. 
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Despite this divergence, piracy was first acknowledged as an offence against the 
law of the nations, but later on, it was degenerated into hostis humanis generis
24
. Thus, 
one thing has been established: piracy is morally condemned, but is this sufficient to 
characterise piracy as an international crime? 
Nevertheless questions arise: What are the exact numbers of attacks? Can we 
exactly calculate? The use of different definitions by IMO and International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) weakens and intensifies the misunderstanding and distorts the real 
numbers of piratical attacks that take place in a certain area during a certain period of 
time. International entities are not the only ones that adopt different definitions; 
domestic systems have also their views on piracy, and they may be or not compatible 
with definitions established at an international level. Furthermore, the absence of 
reported attacks by shipowners is another reason. Shipowners’ apprehensions are related 
to the delay of ships schedule and escalation of insurance premiums due to 
investigation.  
1.2.1. Definition of Piracy 
Piracy does not embrace any consensus, not even around its qualification. 
Cassese
25
 does not qualify piracy as an international crime. Cassese establishes at least 
four prerequisites to identify an international crime, prerequisites piracy fails to fulfil. 
Since piracy is not repressed on behalf of a common value, States remain legitimised to 
punish those acts which are inflicted upon them. Likewise, piracy does not share the 
levels of heinousness of international crimes. Cassese makes his exposition in the past, 
since he considers piracy an “obsolete” crime. Cassese adopts this position at an 
embryonic stage of modern piracy.  
Kraska
26
 embraces the views of Cassese. He is of opinion it is an “error of legal 
analysis” to pursue maritime piracy as an international crime. Kraska agrees that piracy 
should be prosecuted under domestic law and States should cooperate on the grounds of 
universal jurisdiction. Its refusal to accept it as an international crime relies on the lack 
of jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals to prosecute it.  
                                                 
24 Tom Obokata. “Maritime piracy as a violation of human rights: a way forward for its effective prevention and 
suppression.” The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 17, no. 1 (January 2013). pp. 19-20. 
25 Antonio Cassese. International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 16-25. 
26 James Kraska. Contemporary Maritime Piracy: international law, strategy and diplomacy at sea. California: ABC-
CLIO - Praeger, 2011. pp. 105-108. 
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On the contrary, Bassiouni
27
 reminds us that piracy was the first international 
crime to be recognised as such. However, in a historical perspective he demonstrates 
that international criminal law had not developed as a unified system - the 
criminalization of certain conducts appeared as a result of specific situations –ad hoc-; 
and without regarding if there is a univocal definition of international crime or its 
absence –“haphazard”-. Although, considering a lack of consensus among scholars, 
Bassiouni prompts out a formula to define international criminalization and even tests it. 
His methodology led him to identify and categorise international crimes. From the 
twenty-eight categories detected, Bassiouni groups them in “international crimes, 
international delicts and international infractions”; this distinction is useful because 
each group adopts different policies and different penalties. Piracy integrates 
international delicts
28
, however he observes that this category may integrate “truly 
international crimes” when aggravated –the crime threatens or violate common values: 
such as peace, security and/or human dignity; or demands the cooperation of several 
jurisdictions once its effects goes beyond States boundaries- . Therefore, it will rely on a 
valuable judgement made by States. However, this valuable judgment per se does not 
fulfil legal demands. 
Cryer
29
 [et al.] identifies the core of international crimes as those prosecuted 
under the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals. He does not comprise piracy 
in that framework because of a methodological option. Cryer [et al.] follows the same 
view of Bassiouni and finds all the argumentation around international crime fallacious, 
besides the lack of cooperation and consistency in international law does not provide 
bases to precisely identify international crimes. Based on this conjuncture, nothing 
prevents on transnational crime being classified as an international crime in the future, it 
will only depend on how States value the protected principles. 
Despite the disagreement between authors we perceive piracy as an international 
crime rather than a transnational crime. The reasons for this position rely on the 
escalation of violence used during piratical attacks, which has been threatening world 
security and even economy, and consequently the effectiveness of the measures taken or 
                                                 
27 M. Cherif Bassiouni. Introduction to International Crimnal Law. New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
pp. 109-149. 
28 “Those international criminal law normative proscriptions  that affect an international protected interest , and whose 
commission involves more than one state or harms  victims from more than one state” in M. Cherif Bassiouni. 
Introduction to International Crimnal Law. New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003. pp. 122-123. 
29 Robert Cryer, [et al.]. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. pp. 1-6 and 281-283. 
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its momentaneous success. However, this remains to be discussed in a later chapter for 
we cannot conclude without first clarifying how we identify piracy and how it suits 
reality. 
 UNCLOS’ definition outlined in the following paragraph is the one we choose 
to guide our work. Notwithstanding its wide acceptance as a customary rule, scholars 
have since the beginning criticised how the codified rule narrowed it. In other words, it 
does not accomplish the amplitude of the customary rule, even though, it is the one that 
accomplishes wider consensus and has been gradually adopted in domestic systems, and 
as is the case of the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Tanzania and Seychelles
30
. 
According to UNCLOS statements in its article 101 
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).” 
Taking into consideration this definition and the article 15 of the Convention on 
the High Seas
31
 four elements are required to subsume a conduct as piracy, as Guilfoyle 
identifies: 
                                                 
30 PILPG. “Piracy Definitions in Domestic and Regional Systems.” Legal Memorandum, Public International Law & 
Policy Group (PILPG), March 2013. pp.8-20. Available at 
https://www.google.pt/search?q=pirates&oq=pirates&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.1303j0j8&sourceid=chrome&espv=2
10&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8#. 
31 Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
   (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
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a) “an act of violence, detention or depredation; 
b) committed for private ends; 
c) on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; and 
d) by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, against another vessel 
or persons or property aboard.”
32
 
Nevertheless, we must abridge the points presented in the article 101, mentioned 
above, with the articles 58(2), 102, 103 of UNCLOS in order to understand all the 
elements of piracy. Firstly, offences must encompass the following acts: violence, 
detention or depredation. Secondly, it must be meant for private ends, which many of 
the academics narrow definition into personal gains (acts that rely on political aims 
cannot fall in the definition of piracy) (infra 2.2.).  Thirdly, offences must take place 
within a precise geographic area: high seas or outside of any jurisdiction or Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) [58(2)]. Fourth, the crime requires at least two vessels. Fifth, the 
offender must be a pirate ship (103), which means a private ship ruled by pirates and it 
must pursue the conducts defined in article 101. In addition, a public ship –warship or 
government ship (102) - may also perpetrate piratical attacks if a mutiny occurs and the 
vessel starts to be used to commit the offences in article 101
33
. 
UNCLOS restrains the scope of the customary rule. Conversely, the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention) is known for its broadness. It does not specify piracy, but embraces it in 
the role of offences established in article 3. Furthermore, it enlarges its scope adding the 
following acts: seizure and “control over a ship by force”[3(a)]or, performing “an act of 
violence against a person on board a ship” [3(b)], which means that it does not require 
two vessels in the scenario, thus mutiny is not excluded. Besides, any of those offences 
also fall in the concept of piracy if perpetrated in territorial waters [4(1)]. The lack of 
precision led us to conclude that subjective motivations are also embraced by the SUA 
                                                                                                                                               
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts 
making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 
of this article. 
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Convention, which means that religious, political or economic intents are of no 
relevance. Incidentally, the SUA Convention appeared in reaction to the case Achille 
Lauro and other attacks relying on political motivations. 
However, the SUA Convention is unsatisfactory on jurisdictional grounds. 
UNCLOS contemplates universal jurisdiction in article 105 –“every state” has the 
responsibility to act in order to prosecute pirates and restore peace and safety 
navigation. In contrast, the SUA Convention demands principles of territoriality and 
nationality in order for a State party to exercise its jurisdiction, article 6. Finally, we 
ought to mention that the SUA Convention is an instrument to prevent and suppress 
terrorism, as its preamble highlights
34
. 
Lastly, the IMB definition of piracy, until 2009, adopted the following 
definition: "An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent 
to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force 
in the furtherance of that act"
35
, its scope was broader than those codified in UNCLOS 
and SUA Convention. The IMB definition had been broadly used in its statistics and by 
the mass media to report the number of piratical incidents worldwide. Besides, the flaw 
with the IMB is that it did not have any legal effect
36
. Since 2010 IMB adopted the 
definitions codified in UNCLOS and IMO
37
.  On the other hand, IMO, since 2009, 
adopted into its Code of Practice the definition adopted by UNCLOS
38
.  
1.2.2. How pirates are labelled? 
The legal treatment of pirates raises several concerns. Depending on the 
qualification of their legal status we will know what measures to pursue.  There is a 
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divergence on how pirates should be labelled
39
. They have been seen as: criminals for 
some, combatants by a minority, and others attempt to classify them as civilians.  
First of all, there are no grounds to label pirates as combatants. It is legally 
established that pirates do not endorse any political view and there is no intent in 
perceiving a government. Targets of pirates are independent of the flag pirate vessels 
fly. On the other hand, combatants can only target vessels that belong to the government 
they are struggling against. By the same token, combatants cannot attack civilians nor 
kidnap them. Those actions are outlawed by international humanitarian law. Moreover, 
insurgents are liable for any illegal act on the grounds of State Responsibility
40
. Pirates 
are not constrained by the aforementioned
41
 limits. Moreover, pirates are not under the 
authority of a government, neither are they allied to a State.  Thus, pirates cannot be 
prosecuted by admiralty courts, and no military force can be used to suppress them. 
Even though, Kontorovich notices that pirates fulfil some of the requirements of article 
4 of the Third Geneva Convention, once seizure and hijack-ransom pirates attacks 
entail: “(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (…) 
(c) that of carrying arms openly;”
42
.  Concerning to “(d)… conducting their operations 
in accordance with the laws and customs of war”
43
 Kontorovich states “[a]nd while they 
do not observe all the rules and costumes of war, they often treat captures crews 
reasonably, providing basis for the argument that they would abide by the rules of 
reciprocity.”
44
, however as we are going to see infra the treatment inflicted is far beyond 
of being reasonably and acceptable in terms of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. Besides, pirates no longer incarnate the image of pirates from the 
Golden Age of Piracy (eye patches, hook, wooden stump, feathered tricorn, kerchief, 
parrot…) neither raise the Jolly Roger flag when engage in an attack, so nowadays they 
do not fulfil the requirement of “(b)…a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
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Foundation. September 2010. p.13. Available at 
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40 Douglas Guilfoyle. Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. pp. 
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. Attending to aforesaid, piracy does not satisfy the requirements of an 
international armed conflict
46
 and since combatant status is only recognised in armed 
conflicts of an international nature, pirates do not acquire combatant status
47
. Hitherto, 
piracy has also not been qualified as a non-international armed conflict
48
, since there are 
no grounds to sustain the existence of an armed group against a government neither 
reached an intensity level of violence
49
. Even though, if we classify pirates as 
combatants most of the strategies adopted to counterattack piracy would be fruitless, 
because pirates will be in their legal right to attack and use force against the other party 
and immune from criminal prosecution
50
.  
Secondly, pirates cannot be labelled as civilians. Civilians are those individuals 
who do not take direct part in hostilities; there is no intent to inflict harm to the other 
party. Meanwhile, pirates perpetrate unlawful acts so that they shall not be immune to 
any attempt to stop their activity. In addition, civilians are regarded as having a 
vulnerable status
51
, since they do not share the same resources to defend themselves. In 
contrast, pirates have been arming themselves to attack random targets with the aim of 
obtaining gain. Modern international law admits that pirates are seen as civilians and 
when considering international human rights and international humanitarian law, the 
extrajudicial killing is precluded and it can only be accepted in self-defence cases. 
Outside this scope it is considered unlawful. In addition, UNCLOS determines that 
criminal justice system is the only one that can be applied for cases of such nature
52
. 
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52 Eugene Kontorovich. “"A Guantánamo on the Sea": The Difficulty of Prossecuting Pirates and Terrorists.” 
California Law Review vol. 98, no. 1 (February 2010): pp. 256-259. 
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A third classification was developed as a result of the war against terrorism 
engage by the United States of America (USA), which is “unlawful combatants”. Since 
terrorist, like pirates, were in so called grey-zone, this category was formulated in order 
to respond to the specificities of the conflict. This classification denies rights and 
privileges given to a combatant, more precisely and alarming denies the right of being 
recognise as a prisoner of war (POW)
 53
. However, the USA did not deny the protection 
of the Geneva Convention to pirates
54
. 
Therefore, pirates should be classified as criminals. UNCLOS recognises pirates 
as private individuals to be prosecuted under the jurisdiction of criminal law.   And as 
such, counter-piracy operations cannot exceed reasonable force. Although States 
endorse the use of “all necessary means”, by the Resolution 1816, to supress Somali 
piracy, this does not legitimates the use of lethal force, for example military forces 
cannot sink a pirate vessel
55
. Otherwise, such States’ actions would be classified as 
unlawful. So, the nature of counter-piracy measures can only rely on police powers
56
. 
However, this police nature does not prevent the use of a military naval force to seize 
pirate vessels, once we must take into consideration economic and human constraints, 
for instance the absence of a trained and specialised police to counterattack
57
. Moreover, 
such practice is allowed according with the first principle
58
 of the Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms (BPUFF) and articulating with the commentary to article 
1 of the Conduct of Law Enforcement Officials:  
“(a) the term ‘law enforcement officers’ includes all officers of the law, 
whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers 
of arrest or detention.  
(b) In countries where police powers are exercised by military 
authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition 
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1.3. Piracy at the Present Stage: the approach of two case 
studies. 
Around the beginning of the twentieth century a new epoch seemed to be 
drawing cases of modern piracy and piracy suppression in terms of strategy and 
operational decisions adopted. In 1992, 3583 piracy incidents were estimated  at a 
global stage, and from 1993 to 2005 there has been an increase of 168 %, observes The 
United Kingdom’ s House of Commons Transport Committee
60
.  
1.3.1. Piracy and the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden 
Nowadays, Somali is going through a chaotic and alarming phase due to the 
organised attacks. Gary E. Weir states that in this region naval forces (US Naval Forces, 
Central Command and Combined Task Force 150 inter alias NATO) deal with 
geographical and jurisdictional difficulties
61
. Another reason for the escalated numbers 
of incidents of piracy is the result of the closeness of “unstable nations”.  But the main 
reason for the escalation of piracy relies on the politic-economic environment.  
Aware of the situation, the IMB appealed for the cooperation of countries 
equipped with resources to combat piratical operations, such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  Piratical attacks started to menace international commerce, ships 
of medical and food supplies (from World Food Programme) and the “traffic that 
supports American forces to Iraq”
62
. Thus, this had to stop somehow. 
Somali Republic appeared in 1960 with a democratic model which was 
overshadowed in 1969 by the dictator General Muhamad Siad Barre. Siad Barre 
organised a maritime force in order to preclude illegal fishery and prevent the “tendency 
toward piracy and maritime crime”. The fall of the dictatorship “opened the door to a 
                                                 
59 Available at 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Background%20documents/CodeofConductforlawEnfOff
icials-E.pdf 
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. Aware of this, the UN took measures
64
 to safeguard the 
ancestral route from Africa into the Gulf of Aden – Red Sea area.  
The fall of the Somali central government in 1995 allied to the departure of 
UN’s forces led to the closure of Somali’s ports to foreign vessels, but on the contrary 
illegal fishing took place in “the Somali shoreline and sometimes inside the territorial 
waters and domestic commercial fishing areas”
65
. As traditional fishery is the way of 
living of coastal villages their subsistence became in risk as a result and a response to 
the invasion of foreign vessels. Piracy appeared and pirates easily acquired arms as a 
result of rivalry among clans.  
According to the IMB the number of piratical incidents rose from 335 in 2001 to 
370 in the following year, providing ways to the eminent risks of attack. In the absence 
of a central authority, The Republic of Somaliland, in the northern and the Puntland 
Autonomous Region, cooperated in order to take control over the territorial waters and 
its resources.  
This situation led to the insurgence of forces. As Gary E. Weir observes “some 
clan warlords controlled the airports, others the maritime facilities and customs revenue 
and still others focused on the profitable business of selling fishing licenses of dubious 
legality. Piracy, as an independent and openly illegal enterprise developed slowly, 
because clan leaders did not wish to have their licencing business interrupted”
66
. But he 
also points out the region of Mugdug as an uncontrolled one, because the lack of 
interest by clans and extreme poverty resulted ties with reminiscences of piracy turn it 
into a more fearful practice –modern piracy-.   
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, former president of Somali, is known for his non-
cooperation to stop piracy.  Under his presidency modern piracy prospered. In the 
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beginning pirates made use of skiffs
67
 that could keep them at sea for two weeks and 
two hundred nautical miles away from the shore. Nowadays, the use of “mother ships” 
allows pirates to be at sea several months with “unlimited” sources from skiffs to 
weapons. The IMB recommended at first that vessels should keep a distance of fifty 
nautical miles from the Somali coast and later two hundred nautical miles. However, 
this advice proved to be inoperative to weaker merchants, who still continued operating 
at ten knots unsafely, without any proper communication capacity and security force. 
Another component that led to the flourishment of piracy was that the Combined Task 
Force 150 was not authorized to patrol and seize in territorial waters of Somalia.  
The shipping industry started to enter into contracts with private security 
companies, and along with the crew there were skilled armed men with military 
background. Other approach of shipowners has been to employ more crew with the 
intent to diminish fatigue’s deficit and increase security levels.  One situation that 
caught mass media attention was the Seabourne Spirit
68
 in 2005 that managed to escape 
a pirate’s seizure due to efforts of the crew and Gurkhas (private security). After this 
episode pirates began to use “mother ships” and attack beyond two hundred nautical 
miles established by IMB. 
The escalation of piratical attacks on 22 April 2008 led countries such as France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States to request a resolution from the United 
Nations (UN) to stop piracy. Therefore, “UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816 
with the consent of Somali” which gave permission to foreign naval vessels to pursue, 
seize and by “all necessary means”
69
 suppress piracy in Somali territorial waters for six 
months. However, this resolution had marginal effects: it diminished piratical incidents 
but did not affect the roots of piracy, for example the creation of a sustainable economy 
grounded on fishing which is being attempted through RECOFI’s intervention. 
  The Somalia situation is fair to say it contemplates: 
-Somali piracy enfolds large webs of complexity; 
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-Hijacking became one of the most noticeable modus operandi in Somali waters 
and surroundings;   
-If the Resolution 1816 authorized the entering of foreign naval forces within the 
twelve miles; The Resolution 1838, on 7 October 2008, requests the intervention of 
States with military capacity to suppress piracy on the high seas off Somalia; States 
under this resolution were authorized to extend their enforcement jurisdiction beyond 
their territorial boundaries, regardless of such intervention is not sustained by 
UNCLOS; 
-In January 2009, Combined Task Force 150 was created to develop 
countermeasures; 
-Somali drew much attention of the entire world, but especially of the USA, 
Europe, India, Australia, Japan, Russia, China and Malaysia; 
- IMB year by year reports the escalation of piratical incidents with a few 
oscillations due to international antipiracy measures; 
-The lack of resources and a centralised government have been deferring the 
creation of local forces to suppress piracy; and by this means, Somalia has been assisted 
by the international community on the ground -destroying pirates’ sanctuaries- and on 
the seas. Nevertheless, merely the destruction or suppression does not solve the core of 
the problem, but only mitigates it. 
-Keith Weinstanly (deputy commander of combined Task Force 150) reports the 
lack of human and material resources in order to prevent any attack (at any place at any 
hour).  The response he advises is private security. However, this type of response is the 
responsibility of shipping companies. 
1.3.2. Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
Consequently, it is important to make a brief introduction of the case of Nigeria. 
This is simply an attempt to understand how “a blessed country”
70
 turns into a stage of 
piracy and maritime crime. 
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The roots of piracy in Nigeria do not differ too much from those discussed in 
Somalia, although Nigeria presents a range of natural resources that we cannot find in 
Somalia. However, the Nigerian population has not been benefiting from this richness 
of Natural resources. Nigeria kept the attention of international community, because 
Nigeria has been taking their own countermeasures to prevent piracy and maritime 
crime. The IMB recounted at least forty–two attacks in 2007 having as targets 
“international shipping and offshore installations”
71
. Nigeria is not the only country 
suffering with this upraise, but also the Gulf of Guinea. 
The Gulf of Guinea has its footprint as a fossil fuels supplier, and the more 
investment that it calls the more maritime security it demands. Those who invest expect 
the return. Are Nigeria and the other neighbour States fully prepared and equipped to 
stop piracy?  
The conflicts’ complexity of the Niger Delta is a result of: the number of States, 
the number of local authorities, ethnic groups, a large number of communities with 
different dialects and the differential treatment given by oil-companies to communities -
some are paid for the use of the land and others not-. This differential treatment has 
been stimulating conflicts and rivalries. It is also important to remember that the higher 
levels grounds, politicians as well as governments have been benefiting in a large scale, 
while their populations live below poverty and in deplorable human conditions. 
Narrowing the scope, Nigeria is known for having the biggest demographic rates 
in Africa. One of the major problems is the social stratification inflated by poor 
governance allied to corruption, pollution and unemployment giving boost to 
criminality and insurgency. Social instability has not converted into a civil war because 
of the reminiscences of 1967-1971. 
While the social and political environment is unstable and could produce 
disastrous results, but fortunately or not this environment has supported piracy, which 
the Nigerian naval forces have to face.  
 One of the most important concerns is the increase of kidnapping that has 
become common practice. Pirates have been creating fear among mariners and 
petroleum workers. In the meantime, fishing industries has also not been kept aside. 
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Pirate attacks targeted to fishing boats increased up to 107 between 2003 and 2007. 
Moreover, in January 2008 fifty attacks were reported alongside resulting in the death of 
ten sailors. So, the growth of attacks is linked to the increase of the rate of violence. 
Pirates are not the only concern of Nigerian maritime forces, there are also insurgents, 
criminals and community activists’ attacks.  
 Arild Nodland observes that the attacks along the Niger Delta and Delta State 
do not follow the same configurations. While in Lagos the attacks are carried out by 
bandits for their personal gains –some are categorised in piracy, others are classified as 
robbery at sea. On the other hand, the attacks along the Niger Delta encompass 
kidnappings in order to obtain ransoms, and have political aims with a high rate of 
violence. There are relevant differences in the nature of actions of piracy between Lagos 
region and the Niger Delta. Arild Nodland states that the attacks in the Niger Delta “are 
also better coordinated and often entail the use of numerous fast attack craft, explosives, 
and heavy weapons, such as 50 – calibre machine guns and rocket propelled 
grenades”
72
. Pirates recognise that they can obtain more gain and success in the Niger 
Delta. Whereas the major number of attacks occurred in this area are those perpetrated 
by insurgents. The principal target of pirates, insurgents and activists are the 
international petroleum companies. 
About these attacks, Arild Nodland states that “an attacker may one day kidnap 
an oil worker to buy a nice car, the next day he may join a raid by a militant group and 
on the third he might hijack an oil rig to generate cash for his tribal chief”
73
. 
The efforts of the Nigerian Navy assisted by Niger Delta Joint Task Force are 
related to the surveillance, security and dominance of territorial waters. The 
combination of several measures can offer a credible determination of the Nigerian navy 
to increase maritime security in the Niger Delta. However, the constant lacks of 
resources as well as the absence of proper leadership and accurate administration have 
been some of the reasons for the lack of effective control of the Nigerian Naval forces. 
Which led us to conclude that Nigeria and the others forces of the Gulf of Guinea are 
not ready to suppress piracy.  
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Arild Nodland recognises that Nigerian reality would not be completed without a 
reference to the “cake”. The same author quotes Marvis Zones to explain that “cake” is 
what the governments held in their power, such as: “revenues, jobs, infrastructures 
projects, access to universities, public-sector employment”
74
. Those resources have been 
pursued by insurgents, criminals and community activists. However “cake” is what 
governments have been deviating from their country and sending it to their foreign bank 
accounts. In the political field, corrupt politicians have been creating alliances with 
criminal groups in order to terrorise and threaten their opponents, opening a breach in 
justice. The prevalence of this system “authorizes” criminal groups to act freely, being 
impunity another factor that has been intensifying the complex reality of Nigeria.  
Therefore, corruption, lack of governance, growth of poverty and social gap 
have been the roots of criminality in the Gulf of Guinea, bringing maritime insecurity to 
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Challenges of Piracy 
In this chapter we will focus on an evolutionary view of piracy its obstacles and 
limitations. Firstly, we will look into a justifiable prohibition on piracy, followed by a 
dynamic where human rights either dictate a solution or are an obstacle to the 
suppression of piracy. Also, chosen forums will be contemplated questioning its 
reliance as a direct response to the impunity gap that international community assisted 
disinterestedly.   
Apart from the legal challenges and limitations attached, human, social, 
economic, commercial and environmental impacts also bring concerns to the prevention 
and combat of piracy. If in ancient time’s war against piracy dictated the banishment of 
the latter one, currently “war” must be supported attending to its several ramifications.   
2.1. Why is piracy condemned? 
Hugo Grotius in The Freedom of the Seas determined the principles of freedom 
of the seas –dictating that seas do not belong to any nation-. Currently, it is commonly 
recognised as a customary rule codified in UNCLOS in its article 87(1) “The high seas 
are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. (…)” comprising freedom of 
navigation on high seas. Relying on the Law of the Nations, Grotius states “Every 
nation is free to travel to every other nation and to trade with it”
75
, in order to supress 
the needs of each nation and to create bounds of fellowship. Conversely, piracy and 
robbery resulted in a rejection of this principle, thus selfishness was one of the roots of 
wrongdoings at the sea, and it remains as such. 
Because the principle of the freedom of the seas was in risk, and more 
importantly safety navigation, nations started to limit this freedom extending their 
jurisdiction over the sea. Grotius embraces this thought but with a limitation, “the sea 
appears capable of being made a property by the power possessed of the shore on both 
sides of it; although beyond those limits it may spread to wide extent, which is the case 
with a bay, and with a straight beyond each of its outlets into the main sea or ocean. But 
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this right of property can never take place where the sea is of such a magnitude as to 
surpass all comparison with that portion of the land which it washes”
76
. In the 
contemporary epoch, the first nation to attempt this was United States of America 
extending its territory up to three miles, being followed by other nations. 
Guilfoyle mentions that piracy compromises high-seas’ freedom of navigation, 
which is a common interest of all States. Notwithstanding, he also justifies the 
prohibition of piracy on the grounds that pirates are enemies of all mankind, pointing 
out that this is more a label than a substantive element. If this “rhetorical phrase” 
echoed a substantive element, the law of piracy would be always applicable wherever 
perpetrated (high seas or territorial waters)
77
. Obokata also follows this line stating that 
piracy is seen as hostis humani generis, but does not achieve the level of delicta juris 
gentium. In other words, although not recognised as one of the most heinous 
international crimes it is a crime over which international courts have no jurisdiction, as 
Cryer [et al]
 78
 observed. The last two authors came to the same conclusion. States look 
upon piracy as a crime to be suppressed under domestic jurisdiction rather than based 
on international grounds
79
. Thus, States have celebrated treaties, still this does not 
obliterate the duty of States to criminalise such conduct in their domestic system. 
Additionally, it demands the intersection of human rights. 
Piracy was labelled by Kontorovich as an epidemic
80
. This classification not 
only concerns its growth and proliferation, but also the dimensions affected. Recently, 
the human aspect has been the token of the epidemic, though commercial and economic 
dimensions were the first two to be pointed out. If in the beginning kidnappings-
ransoms were one of the touchstones of maritime piracy, now murders of sailors, and 
the impact on their families and tourists became a delicate issue.  
Thus, questions arise:  
What is the human cost of piracy?  
What are the collateral effects of counter-piracy operations?  
Since 2011 a joint effort has been made by the Oceans Beyond Piracy project 
sponsored by One Earth Future Foundation, IMB and MPHRP in order to cross 
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information to produce an annual report that may present the reality of human cost –The 
Human Cost of Maritime Piracy. The most vulnerable targets of piracy are the seafarers 
and, as a second degree of victims are their families. 
 The above report takes into consideration the attacks that occurred in Somalia 
and in the Gulf of Guinea. As for Somalia
81
 the report revealed a number of 589 
seafarers’ hostages (340 from 2012 plus 240 from 2010 and 2011) the average period of 
captivity was 11 months. One of the biggest concerns is the period of captivity 
correlated with the conditions that hostages are kept in. The pirates use both types of 
violence over the hostages: physical and psychological. The former involves slaps, 
stabs, wound shots, isolation, deprivation, which involves leaving hostages in the deck 
during sun hours, forcing them to kneel on deck plates which cause second degree burns 
or throwing hostages overboard. Most of these abuses occur because seafarers cannot 
cope with pirates’ demands on technical issues related to ships. This last circumstance 
reveals signs of slavery. Psychological abuses take seafarers into an inhuman level, but 
the harassment also extends to their families, for instance: “allowing the seafarers to 
speak to their families, then taunting them, abusing them and firing shots into the air 
while their families were on the line.”
82
 Deaths are also acknowledged as a consequence 
of hostages being used as human shields or a prolonged inhuman treatment that the 
hostages meet. 
On the contrary, the number of reported attacks in the Gulf of Guinea
83
 
surpassed the reported ones in Somalia. The number of hostages did not reach than 
those in Somalia, it remained to 206 with an average captivity period of 4 days. Pirates 
from West Africa do not see ransoms as a primary source of profit, their first focus are 
the stolen objects easily convertible in cash. However, the degree of violence used by 
pirates from Niger Delta is higher than the violence used by pirates from Somali, since 
they are more acquainted with the use of weapons and higher levels of sophistication. In 
addition, the intensity of violence also depends on the type of piracy. There are four 
types of approaches made by pirates in these waters, which are: a) tanker hijacking, b) 
kidnap and ransom, c) armed attacks not for hijack, and d) subsistence piracy. Extreme 
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violence has been identified in attacks not for hijack(c) where the pure intent is to steal 
cash and/or objects easily convertible into cash. The use of weapons also upraise the 
levels of violence and risk, being this conjuncture noticeable in the former type, as well 
as those intended to steal the cargo –tanker hijack-. Surrounded by this terror 
environment seafarers commonly present levels of stress and anxiety, and moreover a 
constant feeling of fear of being boarded by pirates. Wound shots, threats with weapons 
and physical violence are the commonly offences reported in these waters. 
So, inviolability of the principle of freedom of seas is no longer the major 
concern, but rather the life, safety and dignity of seafarers and their families. Not only 
does piracy have roots in the lack of human dignity, but also itself enlarges this lack of 
care for humanity. Then, the prohibition on piracy cannot rely only on freedom of 
navigation or its impact on maritime trade, but also and more importantly in the 
vulnerability of vessels, its crew and passengers.  
2.2. Limitations implied by UNCLOS’ definition 
UNCLOS presents several limitations. Firstly, piratical attacks cannot be 
connoted to political aims, but only to private ends, unless political motivation is seen 
as exclusion. It is generally acceptable that the purpose must be personal gain, unless 
the action cannot be subsumed into piracy. Guilfoyle states “[t]he test of piracy lies not 
in the pirate’s subjective motivation, but in the lack of public sanction for his or her 
acts”, being public acts “tested (…) by reference to state action or authority.” This 
means that the actions of pirates are not under the authority of any sovereignty.  In order 
to emphasise the relevance of objective elements over drowning the subjectivism, 
Guilfoyle intertwines his argumentation not only appealing into insurgents’ status but 
also terrorist acts. He resorts to the insurgent’s status to distinguish them from pirates, 
and likewise relies on the limits of insurgents: insurgents on the high seas can only 
attack vessels of the government they are struggling with, so that the exemption could 
subsist merely contemplating the “the class of vessels attacked”
84
 (aiming to deviate the 
exclusion from the subjective intent).  By the same token, he also states that what gives 
right to prosecute pirates is not their intent in obtaining personal gain, but the approach 
they take: pirates act “outside the law of a state-based system” and perpetrate violent 
                                                 






. The author reasons for acts of terrorism there is no excuse in 
relying on political intents or other excuses. By the end, Guilfoyle also remarks: “a 
violent act’s political motivation should not be seen as relevant to its characterisation as 
an ordinary crime. The words for ‘private ends’ simply emphasise that the violence 
involved lacks state action or authority’ which can “be tested objectively”
86
. On the 
other hand, mutiny, which endorses political motives, does not fall under piracy, but it 
remains an unlawful act to be suppressed under the SUA Convention. 
In terms of geopolitical strategy no longer a nation encompasses the 
jurisdictional power of the older British Empire, thus geographical limits come to the 
forefront.
87
 Crimes subject to the principle of universality are usually not limited, 
however piracy is a case apart. After all, States beyond their boundaries can make use of 
universal jurisdiction if the piratical attack occurs on the high seas or outside of any 
States’ jurisdiction
88
. If the attack is perpetrated on territorial waters it does not fall 
under universal jurisdiction, but in the scope of domestic systems.   
Thus, two questions arise: until what extent can piracy be repressed? Are States 
authorised to enforce its jurisdiction to supress piracy on EZZ and contiguous zone?  
As we have seen above (chapter 1.2.1) in the article 58(2) the regime of high 
seas applies to EEZ “in so far they are not incompatible…” Guilfoyle quotes UNCLOS’ 
commentaries where the observance of a “unified character of the oceans” was a 
primary aim. Whereupon, he states that no haziness of article 86 of UNCLOS should 
prevail in the enforcement of criminal law in the EZZ and contiguous zone.
89
 In 
addition, we must take into account the ‘reverse hot pursuit’
90
, for example: commonly 
if a pirate vessel after of perpetrating an act of piracy escapes into territorial waters the 
coastal state has jurisdiction to trial. Despite of this reality, the pursuing ship may 
continue pursuing if the coastal state consents its entrance in territorial waters, in order 
to carry on the pursuit.
91
 One remark must be done ‘reverse hot pursuit’ is not 
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contemplated by UNCLOS, but given the geographical limitations of UNCLOS and the 
conjuncture of Somalia the UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008)
92
 in its 
seventh paragraph consented the right of ‘reverse hot pursuit’ for a period of six 
months. The following resolutions renewed the consent to entering in Somali territorial 
waters in order to pursuit pirates’ ships and additionally allowed land-based operations.  
Being the scope of flag state jurisdiction constrained by piracy and slave 
trafficking [article 92(1) of UNCLOS], States have the right to board other vessels if 
“there is reasonable” suspicions of piracy or other offences [110(1/a) UNCLOS]. 
Moreover, under UNCLOS States shall co-operate to prosecute pirates on the 
high seas, outside areas of States’ jurisdiction and EEZ, beyond these geographical 
areas the States’ obligation ceases on the grounds of universal jurisdiction, articles 100 
and 105 of –UNCLOS. Besides, Obokata emphasises that the expression “may” in 
article 105 weaken the obligation, and additionally adds that “reasonable ground for 
suspecting” implies a right and not an obligation in article 110
93
, which is classified as 
co-operative limited universality principle
94
. 
 As mentioned above (supra 1.2.), the given jurisdiction bases itself on the 
nature of the offence’s gravity chalking widely cooperation. Looking at article 105 there 
is also no obligation for the seizing state to punish pirates. This article neither 
obliterates the extradition of suspects nor mandates their transference to States which 
have jurisdiction, but such can be sustained in the terms of the extended cooperation of 
article 100 of the same law
95
. However, with extradition human rights concerns arise. 
How and by whom pirates are prosecuted is left to the criteria of domestic systems. The 
reasons come from the silence of UNCLOS, from the procedural constrains and the lack 
of resources to lead in front an entire trial and its imprisonment. Additionally, political 
motivations have been used as an excuse not to prosecute pirates; for instance: the 
United Kingdom asylum laws entitle the offender to remain in the country ad infinitum; 
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As Chang noticed, side by side with other scholars, “UNCLOS only defines the 
circumstances under which universal jurisdiction applies but does not set a universal 
penalty or empower a single tribunal to hear the charge of piracy.”
97
 Thus, what we here 
have is a problem of enforcement of the law, which opens a discussion towards 
universality that we will later develop and discuss in chapter 3.  
2.3. International Human Rights a useful instrument or an 
obstacle? 
Once we appeal to human dignity and compliance with human rights, we ought 
to have in consideration dual approach on this matter. We cannot claim for the respect 
of the human rights from only one of the parties, we have to see that it is respected also 
by the offenders. Justice cannot rely on Talion law. Otherwise it is never going to be 
fulfilled. Therefore, human rights ought to take part not only in the suppression of 
piracy, but even its roots. 
Victim’s Rights & Criminal Proceedings  
Obokata justifies the prohibition on piracy by using international human rights 
as a powerful instrument to control and subdue piracy. This is far more complex as it 
defends essentially the rights of victims as well as of the defendants alike. Obokata 
criticises the fact that victims were set aside by the UNCLOS and the SUA 
Conventions
98
, defending that such reality is unbelievable taking into account the level 
of inhumanity that the victims’ suffer. Therefore, the author defends a balanced and 
dual approach, where the victims’ and defendants’ rights should be regarded equally. 
Nevertheless, the absence of victims’ status on the quoted international instruments of 
the States forces to unit their efforts to fill this gap. Thus, the dignity of victims will be 
restored by bringing pirates to justice and through a program protection. Nevertheless, 
the pirates’ human rights also cannot be disregarded nor ignored at any level.  
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What rights are violated and what kind of mistreatment is inflicted over the 
victims? The range of rights affected oscillates from civil to political, economic and 
social. Why? Because the interdependency and indivisible nature of human rights means 
that there are rights that can only be considered fulfilled when other rights are equally 
taken into account
99
.  When a victim is taken hostage, his right of freedom is subdued, 
followed by inhuman treatment that he is meted out, which may culminate in fatality 
and the consequent violation of the right to life. While hostages are in captivity the 
economic substance of their families is put at risk. As we have seen, in the case of 
Somalia hostages, they are kept as hostages for eleven months which results in a steep 
degradation of their families’ socio-economic status. 
Invoked civil and political rights  Protected economic, social, cultural rights 
Right to life Rights to health, food, water, education 
Freedom from torture/degrading treatment Rights to health, housing 
Right to private/family life and home Rights to health, housing 
Right to property Right to social security, housing; collective 
right to ancestral land of indigenous people 
Protection of the child Rights to health, food, education 
Freedom of movement, residence Right to housing; collective right to ancestral 
land of indigenous people 
Freedom of association Right to form and join trade unions, rights to 
collective bargaining 
Freedom from forced/compulsory labour Right to work/to fair conditions of work 
Table 1: Intersection of Rights100 
Regarding this last statement and what has been discussed earlier in chapter 2.1, 
due to the severity of injuries that were inflicted for which the human rights groups 
demanded the interventions of the States, Justice can be effectively achieved if we 
consider piracy, armed robbery and others acts that threat maritime safety as breaches of 
human rights than simple classification of the threats
101
. Besides, international human 
rights offer a broader range of applicability. Additionally, the classification and the 
distinction of the criminal acts go to a second plan. Moreover, under this branch States 
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are obliged to enable solutions to restore victims’ dignity, such as it is stipulated in 
International Convenat on Civil and Politic Rights (ICCPR) article 2(3), and reiterated 
in regional instruments: European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Even further, States are obliged to enact laws in 
order to bring pirates to justice. Meanwhile, a program of victims’ protection must be 
developed in order to provide medical assistance as well as legal support during the 
criminal proceedings. Additionally, a compensation as much as it is possible in order to 




On the other hand, human rights demand also a number of obligations on States 
in order to prosecute the suspects through detentions until the trail, without disregarding 
their personal rights. In general, this implies that the criminal charges must take into 
account the right to life, the human treatment and free from torture. Once detained the 
suspect “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law”, 
article 9(3) ICCPR, the minimum of this right is fulfilled with access to a consular 
authority article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 
Alongside, articles 9(3) ICCPR and 5(3) ECHR have been dealing with the issue of 
suspects being held for days and, in some cases, the period of detention completes a 
month.  The right to liberty of suspects is being undermined because of the schedule of 
the voyage
103
. This constraint regularly occurs when suspects are detained on high seas. 
In order to tackle this fact detainer States had to enter into agreements with third States 
to assure that suspects are promptly brought before a legal authority –regional response 
to prosecute pirates. Additionally, De Bont makes reference to the automaticity of due 
process rights under SUA Convention
104
, which does not happen under UNCLOS.  
Furthermore, a fair trial is another issue to be considered. Article 14 in ICCPR 
engages two components: one over the jurisdiction, which regulates that the court must 
be impartial, independent and established by law; and another over the accused, which 
shall not be discriminated, and the principle of equality of arms is demanded in 
reference to the opponent. A trial to be fair must guarantee at least a minimum of 
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requirements with regard to the defendant which have been established in paragraphs 2 
to 7 of article 14 (presumption of innocence, freedom of self-incrimination, right to be 
informed of the charge, right to an adequate defence and right to review)
105
. 
Another concern is the possibility of the suspects claim for asylum. Once under 
the jurisdiction of the state-prosecutor, pirates may claim this right. Any attempt to take 
the suspect out of the country compromises the respect for human rights. The United 
Kingdom, distressed with claims in result of violation of human rights, barred the 
detention of suspected pirates by the Royal Navy
106
. Also, the principle of non-
refoulement shall be respected. If there are suspicions that detainees may face inhuman 
treatment or torture
107
 repatriation as well as transference of detained pirates to a third 
State for trial is prohibited.
108
 The scope of article 33 of the 1951 UNHCR was intended 
to embrace both cases
109
. The principle of non-refoulement was later reiterated in article 
3 of UNCAT and article 7 of ICCPR and attending to its historical background the 
principle “crystallized into a rule of customary of international law”
110
. Even so, the 
derogability on international zones is questionable. This last statement does not go 
further once States ought to respect human rights in its territory and persons under its 
jurisdiction. 
A paradigmatic case has been the Kenyan (which endorses anti-piracy measures) 
with which States established and entered into agreements that ensured the respect for 
the rights of defendants. One of the agreements was between Kenya and the European 
Union.  In this case, Kenya guaranteed the full respect for the rights of defendants, and 
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the other party through the EU-UNODC counter-piracy program
111
 agrees to fund the 
Kenyan system of imprisonments and trial expenses in order to support the witness 
program
112
. The main issue is that diplomatic agreements do not guarantee the full 
respect for human rights. These agreements ought to rely on: “establish and implement 
clear procedures for obtaining such assurances; arrange adequate judicial mechanisms 
for review; and ensure effective post-return monitoring arrangements”
113
. Even so, the 
weakness of this instrument has not been an obstacle for the transference of suspects to 
countries where the infringement of human rights is up to date.  
In so doing, Kenya was designated by the Committee against Torture as a 
perpetrator of torture and degrading treatment inflicted upon the suspects
114
. The main 
reports regard the absence or denial to the right to access a lawyer and the detainees are 
not allowed to contact their families
115
, also when convicted the living conditions of 
prisoners are deplorable: “torture, degrading and inhuman treatment, unsanitary 
conditions and extreme overcrowding as endemic”
116
. Nonetheless, other cases come to 
light where the living conditions of prisoners in Yemen are so shameful and the 
disrespect for human life could culminate in the crucifixion of pirates.
117
  
Finally, Obokata does not disregard the consequence of others crimes to be 
perceived on the same grounds. Still, the rights that are disregarded by the pirates 
require a higher protection. Plus the conduct per se encompasses a role of acts that 
aggravate the crime and sophistication provides its effectiveness. As mentioned above, 
despite the decrease in numbers of piratical attacks, pirates have been accomplishing 
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better results in attacks at first shot. This conjuncture allows the condemnation of piracy 
as a violation of international human rights
118
. 
On the other hand, Kontorovich admits that the intersection of human rights may 
hinder the effective suppression of piracy. Pirates’ legal status is not clarified, so it is 
commonly accepted that they fall “in the grey zone between military combatants and 
civilians”
119
. This ambiguity is also notorious when counterattack measures ought to be 
taken, since they must be in accordance to legal grounds. Kontorovich corroborates his 
argumentation bringing into light issues such as: the “potential confusion about pirates’ 
prisoner of war (POW) status, the use of prolonged detention, rendition of suspects to 
countries with poor human rights records, claims of abuse by detainees, the difficulty of 
proving in civilian courts cases arising from active military operations, and the legality 
of ‘targeted killings’ of suspected hostile civilians.”
120
 Attending into the several 
branches of international law he states “the growth of international legal norms that 
limit state authority and provide greater protections for individuals make it harder for 
nations to perform the oldest and perhaps most basic law enforcement  function in 
international law: preventing piracy.”
121
 
If UNCLOS obliges States to suppress piracy, there are other instruments that 
obstacles to that goal, once international rules have been dictating a higher protection to 
individuals. As seen in part 1.2.2, the classic countermeasure of killing pirates violates 
international human rights and humanitarian law. Another argument rests on the 
insufficiency of a “purely criminal approach”
122
 turning a military response an 
acceptable approach by the Resolution 1851. The same Resolution adverts that this 
response must respect international order. Kontorovich refers that the UN Security 
“opened the door” for the classic countermeasure.
123
 However, States have been 
refraining from such action, since they can be accused of violating international 
humanitarian law. If they pursue with this countermeasure States would be responsible 
for killing civilians. Besides this, it is important to remember that on differentiating 
pirates from fishermen, it is a difficult task.  
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Another constraint is set by the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Since pirates are in a grey zone, when detained they 
may enjoy POW status. Article 5 of the quoted convention applies in case of ambiguity. 
As Kontorovich denotes “POW status would not prevent pirates from being 
prosecuted…”, however “the added judicial procedures would increase the uncertainty 
and the cost is high in apprehending pirates.”
124
  
When Kontorovich considers pirates as defendants his approach is harsher than 
Obokata’s. Firstly, there is a difficulty to determine who is a pirate and the means to 
prove it, since pirates as well as seafarers may carry weapons in their boats. Besides, 
once detained the identification of individuals is also an obstacle, because many of them 
do not possess documents that prove their identity and nationality. The lack of papers 
may lead to the detention of innocent civilians
125
.  
Geographic matters also bring constraints to prosecution, because it affects the 
rights of the defendant, which cannot be complied as those of “ordinary defendants”, as 
Obokata identified. One of the obstacles comes from counsel and translation services 




Inhuman treatment on Kenya prisons is also reported by Kontorovich, but he 
adds that religious concerns had come into the light. Currently, the human rights of 
Muslims are in the spotlight as a result of the War on Terror, and there are concerns 
about the Guantanamo scenery being repeated in Kenya. Besides, religious rights to the 
detainees were denied by the captors States captors as has been alleged in the Kenya 
domestic courts.
127
   
Based on the right of asylum Kontorovich describes the reality as follows: 
“Other human rights rules of Western countries increase the cost of arresting pirates to 
the apprehending nation, while decreasing the cost to the pirates themselves.”
128
 In the 
end, it is the pirates who benefit of such circumstances rather than the capturing nation.  
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The implications of the non-refoulement principle are also regarded. Western 
countries have always excluded Somalia for the prosecution of Somali pirates due to a 
virtual judicial system, the certainty that detainers would suffer inhuman treatment and 
the death penalty in case of a trial resulting in a conviction. In order to respect 
international human rights and international refugee law Somali pirates had to be 
transferred to third States, such as Kenya, Yemen and Seychelles. The concerns of 
regional solution are the same as Obokata’s.  
The relevance of International Human Rights in uprooting Piracy 
The roots of piracy are another touchstone of human rights. Poverty, unlawful 
governments and “socio-political instability” have been identified by several scholars as 
the roots of piracy
129
. Having been already acknowledged by ancients and recognised 
century by century their mitigation has been seen with indifference, which remains until 
the present day. At first, a sense of meaninglessness embodied States, but their 
compliance with the above subjects took place when they saw their interests being 
compromised. UN took the lead and, in consonance with the Millennium Campaign 
there were eight objectives to be responded; they were: end famine, establish universal 
education, promote gender equality, promote child health, promote maternal health, 




Mejia Jr. [et al.] developed a study where they trace the connections between the 
roots mentioned above and piracy in 152 countries (where piratical incidents might 
occur). In order to do so, they took into account variables such as: Generalized Pareto 
Distribution (GPD) per capita; civil and political rights and freedom status engaging the 
indicators from the Freedom House organization
131
. 
They concluded that in countries where there is a high GPD, piratical attacks do 
not occur, in contrast in countries where income decreases, the number of piratical 
incidents rises. In the same way, where political and civil rights are diminished, the 
number of attacks is increased. Also, the intersection and escalation of variables led to a 
decline of piratical incidents or its extinguishment. Although, Mejia Jr. [et al.] identify 
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Somalia as “a clear case of a country in which economic development, political and 
civil rights and freedom status stagnated from 1996 to 2008, while acts of piracy have 
skyrocketed in the last few years”
132
 the data is not clear. In others words, there are 
variables which make the number of piratical attacks oscillate. Pavlov, through the 
System Dynamics, draws the entire Somali environment, which we will develop in the 
third chapter. 
States have an obligation to secure human rights and its respect. If not 
contemplated, the living conditions of society are undermined by poverty, famine, 
unemployment and ruled by social instability. Besides the absence of a central 
government or its weakness to respect, protect and fulfil human rights leads to anomie. 
A region where this conjuncture is noticeable creates a “subculture willing to support 
individual criminal behaviour, operating in an environment to stop it.”
133
 So, anomie is 
the absence of a moral and social conduct that produces “deviant behaviour and 
ultimately social upheaval.”
134
 Those deviate behaviours are associated to the raise in 
criminality. Shane and Lieberman explain piracy through the “Opportunity Theory” 
which embraces three perspectives: the routine activities approach, the rational choice 
perspective and the crime pattern theory.  
Routine activities approach indicates that a crime is close to be perpetrated when 
three conditions are fulfilled:  
1) “the presence of a motivated offender”: piracy results from the lack of 
human dignity;  
2) “the presence of a suitable target”: pirates chose their targets in 
accordance to the aim they are after. ‘Suitable targets’ comprehends the 
following qualities: value, inertia, visibility and access. Which remind us 
of the nature of attacks in Nigeria. Pirates who perpetrate ‘armed attacks 
not for hijack’ and ‘subsistence piracy’ are after cash or objects easily 
convertible into cash (value). Inertia and visibility recall ‘taker hijack, 
where the weight vessels can be spot from the shore line or mother ships.  
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The rational choice perspective is associated to the balance made by the offender 
in order to pursue or not with the wrong. Pirates present higher predisposition to 
perpetrate the wrong rather than avoid it. Once the living conditions of pirates and the 




Crime pattern theory, advocates that the environment may condition the means 
to commit the crime. If in the beginning piracy had a “raw” approach, now due to its 
perpetuity and surrounding environment –corruption, instability- it opens the door to its 
sophistication.
138
 The sophistication of technic and the rate of success of attacks imply 
that pirates have been having access to legal information and technological knowledge 
to circumvent the law. 
In conclusion, the “Opportunity Theory” helps us understand and identify 
patterns so that strategies could be drawn to reduce the opportunity. 
Therefore, more than ever the challenge is on human rights. As aforementioned 
human rights are only achieved as a whole if all the nuances are also completely 
considered. Social and economic rights when disregarded undermine civil and political 
rights. On the contrary, when civil and political rights are not respected adequately it 
does not hinder the development of social and economic rights, but it prevents their 
higher efficiency. Good governance is also connected to the observance and 
development of human rights. Therefore, States have the obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights, and in case of violation remedies must be also considered. 
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Nevertheless these obligations cannot be regarded in a narrow perspective –within 
States’ territories-, but ought to be transplanted towards international community.  So, 
States are obliged to enact good governance within their boundaries towards individuals 
under its jurisdiction, and outside frontiers States are bound after other States to assist 
vulnerable individuals exposed to the most degrading ways of living. 
2.4. Brief analysis on study cases 
The roots of piracy were previously identified supra in chapter 1; however, we 
have not disclosed those roots in detail. At this point, our intention is to ascertain the 
roots of piracy, the evolutionary scenery, and the impact of piracy and additionally the 
effects of counter-piracy operations.  
2.4.1. The Aden’s Gulf: the core of oil intersection 
 
Figure 1: Piracy in the Indian Ocean139 
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One of the roots mentioned by scholars has been the geographical location. As 
we can perceive in Figure 1 there is a close proximity of waters. In the beginning the 
core of piracy took place “around the port of the Mogadishu to areas outside the Somali 
waters, extending into the Gulf of Aden and downwards towards the exclusive 
economic zone of the Seychelles”
140
. The Gulf of Aden is known as one of the busiest 
lanes of maritime transportation, being the major route for crude oil. The market has 
been severely affected by piracy resulting in the fluctuation of oil prices. Besides this, 
the entire piratical organisation depended on land infrastructures. The acceptability of 
coastal villagers had been for long the basic settlement of pirates, providing them 
outlaw ports and dens to keep hostages for undetermined periods of time. As a payment 
for this land sanctuary an amount of the ransom is distributed among impoverish 
Somalis. This acceptability has yet an additional reason: “Somalis’ perception that 
foreign countries are profiting from their country’s ‘misery’ has served to increase the 




The absence of a central government is no longer the flaw on the system, but 
rather its weakness, which has been diminishing the possibilities to overpass the 
stateless stage. Its de non facto control over all territory resides on the ethnographic and 
religious multiplicity and its historical background although it elucidates how Somalis 
had always been against a central government. Lewis incarnates the spirit of Somaliland 
people as follows: “Somalis have an unusually wide-ranging tolerance of the absence of 
centralized government. From a traditional perspective indeed, they could be said to 
need States less than need them!”
142
 Allied to the environment we have corruption, not 
from the central government, but from the decentralized authorities, notwithstanding the 
efforts of international community, inter alias, the United States and the European 
Union, to redeem Somalia’s complexity from “war profiteers” that take economic 
advantage of the instability and impoverishment of Somalis
143
. 
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The perpetuity of piracy in the Horn of Africa is due the alleged argument of 
sustaining economy or at least the coastal communities. Piracy has been for long the 
employment centre of Somalis; fishermen turn into pirates because foreigners’ illegal 
fishing put at risk their sustenance. As such, at shore a piratical industry has been 
developed to sustain the activity, which in turn results in the appearance of alternative 
jobs. The unemployment has been identified as another cause for the growth and 
persistence of piracy. Percy and Shortland state that there is an incontestable truth of the 
impact of piracy on Somali economy
144
. However, the numbers are unknown.  
However, questions have arisen about the alleged linkage of pirates to Islamist 
movements. Nevertheless, this association has been dismissed as a result of the 
heterogeneity, the ethnography and religiosity surrounding piracy for it brings to mind 
that pirates “prioritise their clan affiliations above any ideological alliance”
145
.   In 
addition, different interpretations of Sharia Law support the question of whether pirates 




Piracy impact extends also to the environment once oil tankers became their 
targets. An attempt of an act of piracy can easily risk the ecosystem of the Gulf of Aden 
and prolong the effects. 
The challenge faced by the Horn of Africa, and at the same time transversal to 
other areas, is the “underreporting issue”. As set above a policy of unreported cases has 
been for long established as a result of the escalation of insurance premiums, and not 
even incentives could change this practice. The cost of piracy insurance has gone so 
high, although shippers and insurance companies have been transferring this burden on 
the final consumers
147
. An attempt has been taken to reduce the cost of anti-piracy 
insurance which is the employment of private security teams by shipowners since 
2009.
148
 Moreover, Kontorovich states that, on those “hit-and-run incidents or failed 
attempts”, reports have been impoverishing the development of shipping industry with 
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the costs of schedule delays
149
. Besides, the severity of attacks has been also reiterating 
the practice “[o]ne example of underreporting is a case in which a vessel was carrying 
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP). In March 2012, a video was 
released of an incident, in which armed guards used significant force against a pirate 
skiff. This incident was reported to the IMB as the firing of warning shots by the 
embarked security team, after which the pirates aborted the attack. However, the video 
shows that meanwhile the ‘warning shots’ are spoken, the actions of the private security 
team clearly indicate that the skiff and its occupants took heavy fire.”
 150
 Private security 
teams have brought another challenge, aside their legal implications, which is: masters 
have given preference to report firstly an incident in a high risk area to the private 




Hitherto, the last Resolution of UN Security Council, concerning Somalia, was 
the Resolution 2125 (2013) which reiterates the condemnation of all acts of piracy, 
reinforces the importance of a specialised anti-piracy court in Somalia. Highlights the 
need to prosecute those who incite piracy and expresses its concern of the participation 
of children in piracy. Renew given authorizations in former resolutions. At last remark, 
appeals to the cooperation of community to supress piracy. 
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2.4.2. Nigeria the core of foreign investment 
 
Figure 2: The Gulf of Guinea152 
 
Nigeria with its natural richness became a target for foreign investors. Despite 
that profit has been decreasing year after year as a consequence of piracy. Piracy 
endangers microeconomies as well as macroeconomies
153
. Even in economic subject 
piracy does not compound a single sovereignty. The ship is flagged under one nation, 
the cargo transported belongs to another one, and besides crew is usually formed by 
individuals of more than one nationality. So, if we want to consider the economic 
impact we must also identify until what extend does it effect. 
In 2012, reported cases showed the estimated value of the stolen objects and 
cargo rounded up to $34-$101 million, which involved refined petroleum products, 
property from the crew, ship’s stores, company cash and ransom. The numbers of 
ransoms are secretly kept and the unreported cases do not enter into the general data 
which precludes the achievement of a real number
154
. In the meanwhile, the rating of 
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success of ransoms has dictated the appearance of criminal groups following the same 
practice. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta began to attack ships and 




Nigeria was considered a dangerous zone at a very early stage. There have been 
reported cases since 1982. Through time, the intensity of violence and the number of 
cases reported has increased,
156
 like in Somalia. This led Lloyd’s Joint War Committee 
to tag the Gulf as a war risk area, which means that the war risk insurance is one of the 
coverage’s for Nigeria waters and surroundings. On the other hand, marine kidnapping 
and ransom insurance coverage were to be taken into account through the years. The 
amount of premiums paid for these two insurances is between $358-427 million in 
2012. 
Another factor contributing to the growth of the cost associated with piracy is 
the lack of training of marine police to counterattack piratical incidents, which obliges 
shipping industry to take their own measures –employment of private armed forces-. It 
is estimated that around $150 million were spent in 2012
157
 on private security alone. In 
terms of military cost, between $100-150 million were spent on training, vessels’ 
acquisitions, patrols and military exercises
158
. 
The other costs are on the labour and the capacity-building efforts. The former 
relates to the amount paid to seafarers in Nigeria and Benin waters –high risk area-. The 
estimated amount for labour cost in 2012 was no less than $30 million and no higher 
than $105 million. The latter translates into the joint effort of Western countries to 
develop maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as well as an Australian effort 
committed to assure human resources
159
, between $2 to 6 million were spent.   
However, an alarming number is the one that represents prosecution and 
imprisonment. It is known that in 2012 the cost was $0, despite the fact that 11 suspects 
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. This situation reveals that the impunity gap remains, and future efforts 
will only succeed if the Nigerian Forum starts to prosecute pirates effectively and with a 
range of effectiveness in the Gulf of Guinea. So that the practice of “caching and 
release” becomes surpass.  




For now focusing on the roots of piracy in Nigeria it is known that there are a 
number of causes that sustain Nigerian piracy and armed robbery. The first one is the 
lack of technology needed to survey, identify and assist the vessels in transit in Nigeria 
waters. Another is the absence of the crossing data between the ministry of agriculture 
and the ministry of transportation results in an unrealistic number of how many vessels 
are in transit in these waters
162
.  
Allied to the supra absence, there are no surveillance means on the territorial 
waters of Nigeria, which obstructs the action of hot pursuit. This encompasses not only 
vessels, but training police and satellites too, which requires the permission to use 
satellites from third countries
163
. 
The social and political instability has caused the proliferation of weapons, 
which adduces and increases the rate of criminality, the creation of criminal groups and 
the progression of violence
164
.  
Like in Somalia, Nigeria also suffers from the stigma of unemployment. 
Unemployed individuals have been voluntarily entering into gangs and armed militias. 
Another similarity is the insecurity not only on sea but also on land, where the 
allocation of resources are less than actually demanded
165
. 
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Finally, it has been reported that pirates have also been attacking for political 
motivations. Still, this is a subsidiary motivation, remaining private ends the leading 
motivation of pirates
166
.   
Considering the flaws and sourceless of Nigeria Navy measures have been taken 
in order to countermeasure the gaps of Maritime Security. Recently, Nigeria Navy 
received three boats and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Nigeria 
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency  (NIMASA) and the Nigerian Air Force, so 
that acts such as hot pursuit may be accomplished. In spite of this improvement some 
challenges remain, such as: 
 “Limited assets to enforce maritime laws as well as monitor and secure 
the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
 Rising incidents of an increased sophistication of pirates armed robbery 
at sea and other unlawful activities in Nigerian waters. 
 Theft and illegal ship-ship transfer of oil in Nigerian waters. 
 Illegal refining activities in Nigerian waters. 
 Marine Pollution in Nigerian waters.”167 
Additionally, other challenges were identified by Dogarawa. Human resources 
were appointed first: “the death of an experienced master mariner as a result of 
successful piracy attack can only be replaced after a very long time”
168
. Allied to this, 
once again, there is the subsistence of the difficulty to distinguish fishermen from 
pirates. The decrease on losses has been another goal to be achieved, since Nigeria is a 
target of foreign investment, the frame of a global market does not encompass this flaw, 
so distortions have been appearing. Programs of youth integration are required in order 
to rehabilitate those who entered into criminal groups and to avoid more from being 
recruited. Usually, these youths considered outcasts as a consequence of their 
economical origins leave school and grow up “without parental moral background”
169
. 
As stated in chapter 1.3.2, corruption has to stop, so the “cake” can no longer be 
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deviated, but instead distributed and invested for the wealth of Nigerian people. Another 
activity to be stopped is the illegal oil bunkering and a last remark take into account the 
environment and pollution that has been dictating the impoverishment of fisheries, 
farms and potable water for drinking and domestic use
 170
.   
Once again the policy of unreported cases has also been established in these 
waters. For example, IMB had 43 vessels that reported piratical incidents; however, 
Risk Intelligence
171
 estimated that 89 vessels were attacked in 2012. The policy of 
incentives to stimulate reports was mentioned by Kontorovich
172
, but its use is not yet 
implemented in the Gulf of Guinea. The incentives translate into the military response 
in case of an attack. Nevertheless, the degree of reaction is below or non-existent vis-a-
vis Somalia
173




Since 2011the UN Security Council has adopted resolutions as a result of the 
growing menace of piracy and armed robbery. Resolution 2018(2011) demonstrates its 
concern, appeals to the cooperation of sates and organizations and Secretary-General’s 
assessment mission on the threat.  
Resolution 2039 (2012) welcomes the report concerning to the Gulf of Guinea, 
the urgency to stop the acts of piracy and armed robbery by the States of the Gulf (as a 
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How to prosecute and prevent piracy? 
As discussed in the previous chapters’ enforcement of the law has been the 
“Achilles heels” to repress piracy. Thus, we intend to study several solutions to 
counterattack modern piracy and attend to the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute 
pirates. Allied to this study the methodology of system dynamics is also going to be 
addressed in order to observe the incursion of the possible responses. 
3.1. The role of Universal Jurisdiction 
Piracy is known as the “original universal jurisdiction crime”. The principle of 
universality allows States to detain and prosecute offenders wherever they perpetrated 
the crime. The gravity and heinousness of the crime gives reasonable grounds to any 
State to try pirates, although no nexus is demanded. The nature of the offense, 
disrespect for human rights, extends the enforcement jurisdiction of States on behalf of 
the security and peace of the international community.   
Universal jurisdiction seeks what is commonly known as universal justice. 
However, this universal justice is constrained by political interests. Limited by the 
political game of sovereignties the role of the principle universality diminishes when it 
takes to prosecute certain crimes under international criminal jurisdiction. In those cases 
domestic courts are the entitled bodies to pursue with criminal prosecution
175
.  
Piracy has been perceived as a threat to peace and international security, even 
though it remains valued as a transnational crime to be prosecuted under domestic 
jurisdiction and not by the International Criminal Court. So, international cooperation 
has been the chosen and executable path to repress piracy. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
path has remained a constant when it covers piracy. Scholars have always noticed that 
the number of pirates prosecuted under universal jurisdiction are less than we could 
suspect and this reality remains as so.
176
 Instead of a mandatory universal jurisdiction, 
the suppression of piracy relies on a right that was given to States as a consequence of 
the gravity of the perpetrated offence.  Gavouneli in her book highlights the following: 
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“(…) exists a distinction between treaty-based universal jurisdiction, which is almost 
mandatory, whereas it seems that the customary form of universal jurisdiction is always 
permissive.”, ending  that piracy, even if contractually codified, is the preeminent 
example of this last reality.
 177
 In a further study Kontorovich and Art bring “An 
Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy”
178
, where they elucidate the 
rate of pirates prosecuted under universal jurisdiction, between 1998 and 2009. One of 
the first conclusions is that China, India, Kenya and Yemen were the only states to 
prosecute pirates under universal jurisdiction, besides the prosecutions occurred in the 
area where the crime was perpetrated.
179
 There were scholars who are of the opinion 
that the universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of pirates had fallen, because of its 
rare use, however Kontorovich and Art side-by-side, with other scholars, reaffirm that 
the non-use of universal jurisdiction by states does not determine its uselessness on the 
prosecution, and moreover, its enforcement was reiterated in several resolutions of the 
UN Security Council.
180
 Additionally, universal jurisdiction is seen as a subsidiary 




Kontorovich and Art showed that universal jurisdiction continues to reveal an 
ephemeral rate of prosecution, from the 1158 reported piratical incidents under the 
quoted jurisdiction only seventeen attacks were brought into justice. They came into 
conclusion that per sixty-eight attacks only one is trial.
182
 Despite of its crescendo in 
Somalia, the authors detected that the rate of the prosecution subject to universal 
jurisdiction does not attain to what reality draws.
183
 As it showed above (UNCLOS 
limitations), the problem relies on the enforcement of the law. The success of the 
enforcement of universal jurisdiction depends on the available resources of states, which 
includes economical, human and technological. The scarceness of naval resources, its 
management, maintenance and the adjacent risk led States to not make use of its right to 
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prosecute pirates. Kontorovich and Art state “until 2008, states essentially ignored 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, but not for the lack of pirates. This is itself 
noteworthy, since international law gives nations an unusual explicit affirmative duty to 
repress piracy outside their territory.” However, universal justice cannot be achieved 
without international cooperation. The surveillance of the seas requires the binding 
efforts of States.
184
 The commitment of efforts does not only come from  the 
surveillance of high seas, but also from a regional response to trial pirates under 
universal jurisdiction, which has been leading by Kenya, Seychelles and Yemen. Those 
actions were welcomed by the UN Security Council. Finally, the gravity of the crime 
has been an agrément to the desuetude of universal jurisdiction. As mentioned above, 
scholars commonly agree that piracy does not achieve the level of heinousness of the 
core of international crimes. As such, the piracy rate of prosecution subject to universal 
jurisdiction is undoubtedly lower than the core of international crimes.
185
  
3.2. Legal Response 
 The Resolution 1918 (2010) brings to the light “the limited capacity of the 
judicial system of Somalia and other States in the region to effectively prosecute suspect 
pirates,”
186
 and “[r]equests the Secretary- General to present (…) a report on possible 
options (…) for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international 
components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal and corresponding  
imprisonment arrangements, taking into account the work of the CGPCS, the existing 
practice in establishing international  and mixed tribunals (…).”
187
   
 Attending to the location of the attacks states with territorial jurisdiction and 
personal active jurisdiction should be the primarily responses to prosecute pirates. 
However, this solution comes to be inapplicable, since Nigeria and Somalia do not have 
the necessary requirements and means to prosecute pirates. As it already been studied, 
Somalia still depends on international cooperation for its fortification. Without a navy it 
is impractical that Somalia could survey territorial waters, besides the Somalia 
government does not have de facto control of all territory. Moreover, its judicial system 
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does not meet international standards for the respect for human rights. So, it is quite 
plausible that Somali pirates may face inhuman treatment and torture.
188
 On the other 
hand, Nigeria has been upgrading its maritime security with proper means. However, 
the growth of naval response is not enough by itself. This should be accompanied by the 
Nigeria judicial system, which has the duty to trial pirates and restore victims’ dignity. 
Nevertheless, we cannot forget the constraints on collecting evidences, once there are no 
specialised teams to secure its non-contamination or destruction, which is transversal to 
other countries.  
Another response could be given by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
However, scholars do not agree in its inclusion in the core of international crimes, since 
piracy does not offend at the same rate of gravity or seriousness, such as is the case of 
crimes against humanity in the countries and war crimes committed quite often by most 
of the countries of the world. Piracy remains to be seen as crime that threats economy 
and not necessarily human dignity. Besides, the limited resources of ICC are another 
obstacle to the prosecution of pirates, which has been growing in the last years 
culminating in what is labelled as an epidemic.  Even though, another current of 
scholars has been defending its inclusion based on a broader interpretation of crimes 
against humanity. Middelburg does not support this last current; nonetheless she draws 
two conceivable inclusions through an amendment or protocol to the Rome Statute.  An 
easiest and less problematic way to its inclusion would be through a protocol, which 
does not unite the States that ratified the Rome Statute, but affects only those who 
ratified the protocol not mattering if those States ratified the original treaty or not.
189
 
Finally, if a broader interpretation is not desirable to include in the scope of crime 
against humanity, a tactful approach must be taken once piracy has been threatening 
peace and degrading human dignity. Pirates have been inflicting more and more 
violence and disregard from the dignity of seafarers and their families in each attack 
they lead. Additionally, slavery has been identified as one of the recent practices, 
subduing a human life to another, even if for eleven months, cannot be acceptable and 
seen as something that does not breach human dignity. The dignity of a human being 
cannot be something at the disposal of states’ interest, neither measurable in compliance 
with its diplomatic games. Thus, a closer look must be taken when one views the human 
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implications that piracy carries, since piracy is no longer merely an act of robbery at 
sea. 
The abovementioned leads us to study a third option to prosecute pirates which 
is to be taken by the captors States. Since UNCLOS does not determine by whom 
pirates should be trialled, captors’ States have transferred the detainees to third States. 
This reality reveals that captor States are not willing to bring pirates to their country for 
trial. Besides, there are too many implications as aforementioned in chapter 2, such as 




Recently, there are 21 States committed to put an end to piracy. However, they 
do not share a single definition. Some states adopted the definition of UNCLOS, others 
broaden it, and there are cases of singular definition. For example, the UK adopted the 
definition established by UNCLOS, Seychelles broadens the definition and Japan 
clarified the definition detailing the acts of piracy given by article 101 of UNCLOS.
191
 
Since the UNCLOS definition present gaps there is a doctrine that claims to a change of 
international definition on piracy, and achieved uniformity at international level this 
should be followed by the domestic jurisdictions. Chang
192
 reveals that such approach 
would be ineffective, because the type of piracy followed in each region differs from the 
others.  Besides, its enforcement requires the compliance of domestic jurisdictions, 
being impractical to guarantee that States would “take the necessary measures to pass 
legislation that applies the new definition.”
193
 
 In line with the prosecution by the flag States, the transference of detainees to 
third States also gives rise to questions of human rights and diplomatic agreements do 
not bind States to respect human rights. The willingness of third states to prosecute 
pirates is based on a program of assistance from the EU-UNODC counter-piracy 
program. As aforementioned, this program aims to cover the costs of trial and at the 
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same time develop their judicial systems. For instance, European assistance covers 
“salaries, logistics, police training, office equipment, prison services and investments in 
the Kenyan judicial system.”
194
Previously, we only mentioned agreements with Kenya, 
Seychelles, and Yemen, since 2010 Tanzania joined as a venue to prosecute pirates. In 
the same year, Mauritius revealed a will to prosecute pirates
195
 and in the following year 
this country put the programme into effect. In 2011 the Piracy and Maritime Violence 
Act was approved, entering into effect in June 2012.  In 2013 the transference of the 
first pirates suspects was made to Mauritius.
196
 Presently, the programme assists: 
“Somali Basin region-Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius, Tanzania, Maldives and 
Somalia.”
197
 Attending to the importance of this programme we present the following 
results: 
 
Figure 3: Counter Piracy Programme in Numbers198 
 
Middelburg presents a fifth solution which embraces the creation of an Ad Hoc 
Piracy Tribunal.  At the time, piracy was not accepted by the Security Council as a 
                                                 
194 Annemarie Middelburg. Piracy in a Legal Context: Prosecution of Pirates Operatting off Somalia Coast. Nijmegen: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011. p. 68. 
195 Ibid. 
196 For additional informations see Counter Piracy Programme, issue eleven: March 2013, in 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_11_wv.pdf 
197 Available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/ accessed on 23 December 2013. 




threat to peace and security at an international level, and today it remains as soon so. 
Regarding Resolution 2125 (2013) Security Council keeps with the same expression 
piracy “continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region.”
199
 Since it does not constitute a threat to peace and security at an international 
level in the eyes of Security Council, an international piracy tribunal cannot be 
established under the chapter VII of the UN Charter.
200
 Middelburg recognises that even 
if piracy does not achieves the same levels of heinousness of those prosecuted under 
ICC, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), nowadays is a real threat to international 
peace and security. Corroborating her thesis based on the following arguments:  
 “Piracy hampers the stability and safety of international trade”; 
 “(…) threatens property and ships, endangers critical seas lines of 
communication and the free flow of commerce”; 
 “(…) undermines humanitarian aid, food security and stability in the 
region”; and 




In spite of taking this position she reveals the advantages and disadvantages of 
this solution. Ad Hoc Tribunals bring advantages such us: uniformity, “create its own 
capacity and resources”, overpasses the lack of will to prosecute pirates, “collect 
evidence and use specialised indicters”, and detail the acts mentioned in article 101 
UNCLOS. As disadvantages: it is a lengthy process, with an expensive annual budget, 
there are reservations concerning into its efficiency and a prevention aim would be 
replaced by the punish one.
202
 
Middelburg also refers the possibility to create a Hybrid Tribunal
203
, however 
she gives more credit to the solution aforementioned -creation of an Ad Hoc Piracy 
Tribunal. Conversely, Lee unveils favourable arguments to the creation of Hybrid 
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Tribunals.  These tribunals “provide an effective method of bridging the gap between 
supranational and domestic responses to piracy”
204
, since its jurisdiction is based on a 
combination of domestic and international law. Further, it is a “cooperative effort 
between national governments and international organizations, and employs both 
domestic and international judges.”
205
 He sets apart the creation of an international 
tribunal, since it is meant to prosecute crimes against humanity. Besides, hybrid 
tribunals “have played an important role in enhancing criminal prosecutions in nations 
lacking sufficient judicial resources”
206
 and eliminate the conflict of concurrent 
jurisdictions.
207
Another argument, hybrid tribunals do not supplant the role of 
developing nations, since its regime combine domestic legal regimes and talents with 
international, and attract the international investment to the progress of judicial system 
from developing countries. Nevertheless, this author remarks that harmonisation would 
be disregard if the court was primarily a domestic product.
208
 Hybrid tribunals’ 
legitimacy derivate from is similar culture and its effectiveness due the closeness to the 
area where the crime is perpetrated.
209
 Finally, Lee does not discard regional tribunals 
as a solution to take into account, however he justifies that “[h]ybrid tribunals may offer 
a third path, on that respects sovereignty through their integration with domestic 




Another thesis is supported by Chang. This author defends the creation of 
regional piracy tribunals. The respect for the territorial sovereignty is the first argument 
given by this author. Additionally, the nature of a regional tribunal allows the adoption 
of a regional definition of piracy and provides “a uniform criminal procedure and 
punishment.”
211
 A regional scope including territorial seas and the high seas can be also 
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envisioned, avoiding of jurisdictional conflicts and finally speedy prosecutions will be 
noticeable, once they are not limited by political interferences.
212
 In 2006, the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
Asia (ReCAAP) entered into force, and it is expected that regions adopt such solution.  
UN Security Council defends the creation of a specialised anti-piracy court in 
Somalia and in the surroundings states, being this position reiterated in the Resolution 
2125 (2013). These courts are meant to be assisted by the international community, 
because of the lack of resources, although the applicable law is the national one. 
National laws must be reformulated in order to punish piratical attacks not only within 
boundaries, but also with exterritorial scope. 
213
  
Tribunal Type  Description  Source of Jurisdiction  
International  Created to try matters of 
international importance, under the 
aegis of the United Nations. They 
may be requested by states to deal 
with matters, such as genocides, that 
would overwhelm those states’ 
domestic judiciaries.  
Derived from U.N. Charter Chapter 
VII powers, or through negotiation 
with a requesting state.  
Regional  Created through multilateral treaties 
involving multiple states in a given 
geographic region. The subject 
matter of the court can be as broad or 
narrow as the treating states desire.  
The powers exercised by these 
courts are derived from the terms of 
the enabling treaties.  
Hybrid  Created as cooperative ventures 
between the U.N. and a requesting 
state. All currently existing hybrid 
tribunals deal exclusively with 
criminal matters. 
Hybrid tribunals have, to date, been 
created with authority deriving from 
an international authority (the U.N.) 
and the hosting nation’s domestic 
laws.  
Domestic   “Traditional” courts, created to deal 
with matters arising within a state.  
Domestic laws vest these courts with 
specific or general authority to hear 
cases. In domestic piracy trials, 
memoranda of understanding allow 
one state to receive and try suspected 
pirates captured by foreign countries 
that are parties to those memoranda.  
Table 2: Tribunal Types214 
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Taking into account what has been mentioned earlier, we first were persuaded to 
adopt the fifth solution given by Middelburg –Ad Hoc Piracy Tribunal-. Nonetheless, 
piracy is still not being regarded as an international crime, but instead as a transnational 
crime. Considering reality we are balanced between the hybrid solution and regional 
one. 
3.3. System dynamics  
The solution of piracy does not have a single response, it cannot be treated as a 
linear solution: a cause and an effect. The reality is far more complex, however we must 
take into account, as for example the fishermen in Somalia. In the system we are going 
to study about the community of fishermen as the core-stock. Furthermore, there will be 
several inputs that will act in the community of fishermen and most important how they 
act on it. From these distortions the feedback can be positive or negative, and from one 
single input appears a microsystem. Every microsystem encompasses loops that act on 
the fishermen community, loops have their own core of vitality and simultaneously 
microsystems interact among them. 
Barry and Staver created a model of piracy to Somalia and relying on the 
fishermen community  we are going to study how each microsystem acts: police 
demand sector, police sector police supply factor, pirates sector, pirate attractiveness 
sector, captivity sector. Before, we studied each microsystem the authors make an 
advertence: “[t]here are three negative loops: Piracy Earnings, Police Capture, and 
Police Effect.”. Thus, the pirates number increases as a consequence of the growth of 
pirates income, and immediately the police responds enhances. This conjuncture leads 
to the raise of police threat and subsequently decreases the earnings of pirates. Police 
Capture loop shows how the number of pirates detained reduces the number of pirates. 
Finally, the Police Effect demonstrates how the increase number of pirates leads to the 
decrease of earnings per pirates.
215
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Figure 4: The Pirate Fisherman Model216 
 
Analysing at first the Fisherman Sector, this microsystem may fork in two 




Instead, Police Sector redounds on fishermen becoming police. However, since 
fishermen must be trained, the time in training represent a delay which is fulfilled by 
external forces. Over the time the number of internal forces growths. However, we must 
take into account that the entrance of external forces becomes a disincentive to the 
creation and development of internal forces. The Police Supply Sector balances the 
number of police and fishermen considering the income of each stock. If police stock 
increases piracy becomes unattractiveness. The Police Demand Sector embraces 
variables, such as: marginal efficiency of police, desired additional police and 
lawlessness. High ranges of efficiency increases the number of detained pirates. The 
escalation of pirates induces to a desired of additional police. And if a considerable 
grade of lawlessness not accompanied by anomie stage it is visible a desire additional 
force appears.
218
 EU-UNDOC programme have been investing for the creation of an 
internal police in order to reduce the external presence in the territory. Besides the 
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presence of international forces within Somalian territorial waters and attacks to the 
land bases have been determining the decrease of lawlessness in the country. 
Pirate Sector also presents a delay, which is the required time for fishermen to 
become pirates. Subsequently, the stock of pirates enlarges if the attractiveness is high 
and successively piracy threat also increases. The success or failure of piratical attacks 
determines the earnings of pirate, in the same way the earnings per pirate will be 
affected by the number of pirates and so the attractiveness depends on the growth or not 
of the earnings.
219
 Currently, Somalia presents a decrease of the number of attacks as a 
reaction of the presence of international forces- Task Force 151
220
- in the Gulf of Aden 
and within Somalian territorial waters. The presence of police led pirates’ leaders to 
redirect its activities to illegal fishing “offering” services of private security to illegal 
fishing vessels.
221
 In the past five years, there were discussions relating to the non-
payment of ransoms in order to decrease the earnings of pirates. However, this response 
did not gain supporters, since human cost would escalate with the growth of fatalities.    
The Captivity Sector is a microsystem that interferes in the sectors 
aforementioned, since captured pirates may be rehabilitated and be reintegrated in the 
fisherman stock or not.
222
 
When focusing on Nigeria the methodology cannot be applicable with the same 
model. Another one must be built in order to introduce the new variables that will be 
identified on the ground and tested how they work inside the different groups - loops – 
that could affect the increase / decrease movements in the macro space of piracy. As 
mentioned above, Nigeria presents different features such as: the presence of a central 
authority, piracy attacks in this area encompass subjective motivation, the main targets 
are oil tankers, as we studied in the subchapters 1.3.2 and 2.4.2.  
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Piracy existed since humans start to navigate and since time immemorial and 
when the navigational activities started. It was considered an uncivilised act was 
condemned by the society and the States. Moreover, pirates’ attacks were induced by 
the greed and their conduct was classified as robbery at sea.  This reality remains until 
today.  
As has been discussed and pointed out above about the history of piracy, it was 
considered as a crime if it opposed the interests of a nation. However, the same piracy 
could be considered as a lawful act if committed by a State or Nation, and if complaint 
or claimed by the suffered ones it was denominated act of privateers. Even though, as it 
has been noticed along the history that it was although organised or commissioned by 
some States or at least they had full knowledge of such crimes committed by one of 
their own men of the State, it was completely ignored by the same state authorities.   
But during the course of time this situation started to take different shape as the pirates 
or illdoers were caught red handed and were taken to justice. This led the states to take 
positive steps which means new anti-piratic laws started to appear. During the passage 
of time the same were ratified by the different States and the countries keeping in mind 
various nuances and difficulties which came to light. International jurisdictions and the 
courts were set up for the trial and punishment of the pirates which we have tried to 
study in the present dissertation. On the other hand, international organisations started 
to take serious steps against piracy obliging the States or countries involved (means the 
origin States of the pirates) to take active part in it and pay the losses suffered by the 
victims. The human rights activists took more serious steps in demanding not only by 
the States or the governments to interfere and punish even more severely the pirates 
who not only robbed the ships but also mistreated the crew members and the passengers 
when during their illegal actions of the pirates they were captured. The demand of 
human rights activists has now become a major concern of the pirates as they are aware 
of the severity of the punishment and condemnation by general public opinion.    
However, as has been discussed earlier piracy has been considered as an 
epidemic. That encompasses a role of legal issues. Besides, the difficulty of repressing 
piracy not only relies on its punishment, but most important in its prevention. On the 
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other hand, as it has also been seen earlier in the previous chapters repressing piracy and 
after capturing the pirates, to decide their punishment have been difficult for the courts 
as the pirates, quite often found belonging to more than one nationality and as noticed, 
to many unidentified countries. Moreover during the course of arrests and remand they 
also requested political asylum which furthermore complicated the job of the pirate 
combating authorities.  
Decreed and organised by several organisations such as UN, IMO and IMB, 
NATO, RECOFI, ReCAAP, MPHRP, One Earth Foundation, EU-UNDOC, NIMASA, 
CGPCS, created numerous laws and theories, such as Mare Libervm, Pax Britannica, 
Convention on the High Seas, UNCLOS and SUA Convention, Geneva Convention, 
UNCAT, ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR, VCCR were brought to light to combat pirates and to 
provide assistance to those who suffered from their misdeeds in the seas. 
Nevertheless, this organisations and human rights activists did not forget to take 
into account the rights of even of those who only do harms to the shipping, economy 
and to the people. These organisations also wanted to improve the situation in the 
prisons of various countries and obliged them to respect human rights and resources. 
In conclusion, although we may not be very sure of it, that most of the 
organisations, countries and courts would be able to do away with piracy as there are so 
many loopholes that have been found by the theorists and authors of the law making. 
Not only that, there are countries which support and provide shelter to the pirates for 
their own political interests, whereas there are others which combat against it as their 
interests are damaged. Therefore, piracy is not one single crime done by some disparate 
people for their personal gains and interests. Can we really finish with the piracy and 
harms done to innocent people once for all? No it does not seem likely. 
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